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This Article advances a novel theory of the political question doctrine by locating its foundations in a conundrum about ultra vires action, exemplified by the ancient question: Who will guard the guardians? The political question doctrine marks
some questions as ultra vires the judicial power, or beyond the jurisdiction of courts
to resolve. Correspondingly, designation of a question as political typically identifies
it as lying within the jurisdiction of a nonjudicial institution to settle. Even after
denominating a question as political, however, courts retain a responsibility to check
actions by other institutions that overreach those institutions’ authority and thus
are themselves ultra vires. The need for the judiciary to press to the outer limits of
its jurisdiction to rein in ultra vires action by other institutions renders political
question rulings less categorical, and also less distinct from merits decisions, than
both judges and commentators have often imagined. The inescapable role of the
courts in identifying ultra vires action by other branches also highlights the possibility of ultra vires action by the courts themselves.
The paired risks of ultra vires action by the courts and ultra vires action by
other branches if the courts could not assert jurisdiction to restrain them—both
made vivid by the political question doctrine—define what this Article calls the ultra
vires conundrum. The ultra vires conundrum, in turn, gives rise to what we might
think of as ultimate political questions: What happens if courts err in their determination of the outer bounds of their own power? If the courts act ultra vires, do their
decisions bind conscientious officials of other branches? And if not, who gets to decide when judicial action is ultra vires?
Besides formulating the ultra vires conundrum and answering the questions
that define its core, this Article solves a number of more traditional, interrelated
puzzles about the political question doctrine that appear in a new light once the ultra
vires conundrum lies exposed. It also traces previously unexplored connections between political questions and the ideal of the rule of law.
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INTRODUCTION
The political question doctrine—which affirms that some constitutional questions lie beyond judicial jurisdiction to resolve,
and can in some instances be settled authoritatively by other
branches—occupies an odd status. Although such a doctrine indisputably exists, debate abounds concerning its nature and foundations.1 As an additional basis for puzzlement, the Supreme
Court almost never invokes the political question doctrine.
1
See Parts II–III. Some commentators deny that it should exist at all. See, for example, Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the “Political Question”, 79 Nw U L Rev
1031, 1059–60 (1985); Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 Yale L
J 597, 622 (1976) (arguing that “[t]he ‘political question’ doctrine . . . is an unnecessary,
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The Court’s most recent deployment of the political question
concept in Rucho v Common Cause2—to hold challenges to partisan gerrymanders nonjusticiable3—was therefore unusual as well
as controversial. In 2004, Justice Antonin Scalia’s plurality opinion in Vieth v Jubelirer4 had prefigured Rucho by concluding that
political gerrymanders present political questions due to an absence of judicially manageable standards for determining when
partisan advantage seeking goes “too far.”5 But Justice Scalia
could not muster a majority either on that occasion or in a subsequent gerrymandering case.6
If one puts Vieth aside, only twice since the 1930s had the
Supreme Court ordered the dismissal of a case on political question grounds prior to Rucho. In Gilligan v Morgan,7 which held
that a suit for injunctive relief against National Guard officials
presented a political question, the Court reasoned that Article I
grants Congress “the responsibility for organizing, arming, and
disciplining the Militia . . . with certain responsibilities being
reserved to the respective States.”8 In light of Article I’s delegation of authority to Congress and the president’s powers as commander in chief, the Court ruled that it would be inappropriate
for the judiciary to intrude in ongoing, discretionary decisions
about training and choice of weaponry.9 In Nixon v United
States,10 the Court concluded that Article I, § 3, clause 6, which
provides in part that “[t]he Senate shall have the sole Power to
try all Impeachments,”11 gives the Senate judicially unreviewable

deceptive packaging of several established doctrines” that sometimes appropriately deny
relief, including denial of remedies “for want of equity”).
2
139 S Ct 2484 (2019).
3
Id at 2508.
4
541 US 267 (2004).
5
Id at 296 (Scalia) (plurality). Prior to Vieth, in a concurrence joined by Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice William Rehnquist, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor had
argued that challenges to political gerrymanders presented political questions. See Davis
v Bandemer, 478 US 109, 144 (1986) (O’Connor concurring in the judgment).
6
See League of United Latin American Citizens v Perry, 548 US 399, 511 (2006)
(Scalia concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). In a more recent case,
the Court avoided the question whether challenges to partisan gerrymanders present political questions by holding that the plaintiffs had failed to establish standing. Gill v Whitford, 138 S Ct 1916, 1933–34 (2018).
7
413 US 1 (1973).
8
Id at 6.
9
Id at 7–11.
10 506 US 224 (1993).
11 US Const Art I, § 3, cl 6.
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authority to determine the procedural requisites of an impeachment trial.12 The Court was fortified in this conclusion, it said, by
an absence of judicially manageable standards for resolving impeachment disputes.13
Rucho was different. Unlike in Gilligan and Nixon, the Court
found no constitutional commitment of authority to another
branch with which judicial involvement might interfere. In especially sharp contrast with Nixon, in which the Court ruled that
the Constitution charges the Senate, rather than the courts, with
interpreting the Impeachment Trial Clause, Rucho did not point
to any other institution to which the Constitution commits
responsibility to enforce the Equal Protection Clause or the First
Amendment, the two provisions on which the challengers principally relied. Instead, the Court based its ruling entirely on the
absence of judicially manageable standards “for deciding how
much partisan dominance is too much.”14
This Article advances a novel theory of the political question
doctrine. It seeks to reframe thinking about political questions by
demonstrating that a single, inescapable conundrum—which
prior scholarship has failed to diagnose—both explains the political question doctrine and haunts Supreme Court decisions about
whether to apply it in most of the modern cases. The conundrum,
which may be endemic to judicial review within a constitutional
democracy, involves the threat or phenomenon of ultra vires action—or action that exceeds the outer bounds of lawful authority—by any constitutionally empowered and limited institution,
including but not restricted to the judiciary. The ultra vires conundrum may be less visible in Rucho than in cases such as Nixon
in which the issue turns on whether the Constitution assigns responsibility for resolving a constitutional dispute to a branch
other than the judiciary. Even in Rucho, however, it forms a crucial part of the background.

12
13

Nixon, 506 US at 226.
Id at 228–29:

As the discussion that follows makes clear, the concept of a textual commitment
to a coordinate political department is not completely separate from the concept
of a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
the lack of judicially manageable standards may strengthen the conclusion that
there is a textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate branch.
14 Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2498, quoting League of United Latin American Citizens, 548
US at 420 (Kennedy) (Kennedy writing only for himself in this portion of the opinion).
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The conundrum, in a nutshell, is this: The political question
doctrine marks some questions as ultra vires, or beyond the jurisdiction of courts to resolve. Even after denominating a question
as political, however, courts typically retain a responsibility to
check actions by other institutions that overreach the outer limits
of those institutions’ authority. As a result, denomination of a
question as a political question marks a less categorical commitment to judicial nonintervention than many and perhaps most
commentators have imagined. Furthermore, the less-thancategorical effect of political question rulings invites the question:
What happens if courts, in claiming to identify ultra vires action
by other branches, err in their determination of the outer bounds
of their own power? If the courts act ultra vires, do their decisions
bind conscientious officials of other branches? And if not, who gets
to decide when judicial action is ultra vires? In this Article, I argue that these questions loom in the background when the Supreme Court purports to determine the outer limits of the judicial
power to decide constitutional questions authoritatively.
Even when the Supreme Court decides exceedingly contentious constitutional questions—in Citizens United v Federal Election Commission15 or Roe v Wade,16 for example—we ordinarily
take it for granted that the Court’s ruling should, and indeed
must, be authoritative; it is the function of the courts “to say what
the law is.”17 To express the point in terminology introduced by
Professor H.L.A. Hart, the rule of recognition in our legal system
almost invariably requires both citizens and nonjudicial officials
to accept judicial determinations.18 But that ordinary assumption
depends on the premise that the court resolving a question acted
within its jurisdiction.19
In the case of a serious claim that a judicial ruling was ultra
vires, different questions would present themselves. A judicial
ruling that was ultra vires—for example, one determining that
the Senate’s conviction of an impeached president was constitutionally invalid, if we take Nixon’s holding as a fixed point—

15

558 US 310 (2010).
410 US 113 (1973).
17 Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
18 See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 94–95, 100–10, 116, 256 (Clarendon 2d ed
1994) (discussing the nature and functions of the rule or rules of recognition).
19 See William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 Georgetown L J 1807, 1862 (2008)
(arguing that the judicial power to bind the president applies only when a court is acting
within its jurisdiction).
16
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would, in Professor Charles Black’s resonant phrase, have no “title to be[ ] obeyed.”20 And when a serious claim is made that a
judicial ruling is ultra vires, the question thus necessarily
emerges: Who gets to decide, authoritatively, whether the Supreme Court, in ruling that a question is not a political question
and in purporting to settle it on the merits, has exceeded the
jurisdiction-based limits of its claim to obedience? In my view, no
analysis of the judicially defined political question doctrine could
be satisfying without exploring its relationship to the ultimate
political questions of whether ultra vires judicial decisions would
deserve to be obeyed and, if not, of who would and should determine whether judicial decisions are ultra vires.
Formulating the ultra vires conundrum inaugurates, but
does not complete, this Article’s reconceptualizing agenda. After
laying out the ultra vires conundrum, this Article goes on to solve
a number of more traditional, interrelated puzzles about the political question doctrine that appear in a new light once that conundrum lies exposed.
The first involves whether the political question doctrine is
jurisdictional. The modern Supreme Court says recurrently that
the political question doctrine expresses Article III’s limitation of
the judicial power to the resolution of cases and issues fit for judicial decision.21 But reflection on the ultra vires conundrum and
on the details of sometimes-overlooked Supreme Court rulings establishes that the identification of a question as political frequently does not entail that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Perhaps more typically, identification of a question as
political requires judicial acceptance of the ruling of another
branch as authoritative, as long as the ruling is not ultra vires.

20

Charles L. Black Jr, Impeachment: A Handbook 61–62 (Yale 1974).
See, for example, Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2494 (asserting that before deciding a question of constitutional law, a court must ascertain that “the question is presented in a ‘case’
or ‘controversy’ that is, in James Madison’s words, ‘of a Judiciary Nature’”), quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp v Cuno, 547 US 332, 342 (2006); Zivotofsky v Clinton, 566 US 189, 195
(2012) (asserting that a court “lacks the authority to decide [a] dispute” involving a political question); DaimlerChrysler Corp, 547 US at 352 (tracing the political question doctrine
to “Article III’s ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ language”); Gilligan, 413 US at 9 (asserting that federal courts “have no jurisdiction” over “nonjusticiable political question[s]”) (emphasis
omitted), quoting Morgan v Rhodes, 456 F2d 608, 619 (6th Cir 1972) (Celebrezze dissenting); Powell v McCormack, 395 US 486, 518 (1969) (“[F]ederal courts will not adjudicate
political questions.”). See also Tara Leigh Grove, The Lost History of the Political Question
Doctrine, 90 NYU L Rev 1908, 1948–50 (2015) (emphasizing the jurisdictional character
of the modern political question doctrine).
21
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Insofar as Rucho marks an exception to this norm, it is only a
partial exception.
A second traditional puzzle concerns the bases on which
courts properly identify political questions. I defend a pluralist
approach that subsumes a variety of theories that others have
viewed as mutually exclusive. In particular, I explain how prudential reasoning can occur within—rather than as an alternative
to—analysis focused on the rights of the parties to a lawsuit and
the constitutional powers and obligations of the judicial branch.
A third question follows from the answer to the second: If
multiple grounds support invocation of the political question doctrine, why does the Supreme Court apply it so seldom? The answer, I argue, has to do with the nature of modern constitutional
law and, in particular, with the wide range of factors that today
affect constitutional adjudication on the merits. The political
question doctrine has shrunk almost to nothing in the Supreme
Court22 because the kinds of considerations that bear on political
question determinations are frequently inseparable from the considerations that bear on merits rulings. Seen in the context of a
myriad of other judicial decisions—including those in which the
Supreme Court established the one-person, one-vote principle—
Rucho is the exception that proves the rule.
If merits and political question reasoning overlap to such a
great extent, a fourth question arises: Why does the Supreme
Court preserve a political question doctrine at all? My answer
holds that the political question doctrine endures because the
Court, understandably and appropriately, wants to maintain a
mechanism with which to signal as adamantly as possible that
neither other branches, nor litigants, nor the public can look to
the judiciary to resolve a question that the Court believes illsuited for judicial decision. Nevertheless, from the perspective of
22 The doctrine appears to have a greater importance in the lower courts. See J. Peter
Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U Pa L Rev 97, 107 nn 26–27
(1988) (discussing its application to the constitutionality of the wars in Vietnam and Nicaragua); Stephen I. Vladeck, The New National Security Canon, 61 Am U L Rev 1295,
1325 (2012) (discussing its application in national security cases); Rachel E. Barkow, More
Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial
Supremacy, 102 Colum L Rev 237, 267 n 158 (2002). A partial explanation for the disparity may be that the lower courts, unlike the Supreme Court, cannot simply deny certiorari
as a means of avoiding the need to resolve questions that they think they ought not to
resolve. See, for example, Lexmark International, Inc v Static Control Components, Inc,
572 US 118, 126 (2014) (affirming “that ‘a federal court’s obligation to hear and decide’
cases within its jurisdiction ‘is virtually unflagging’”) (quotation marks omitted), quoting
Sprint Communications, Inc v Jacobs, 571 US 69, 77 (2013).
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the Court, the signal sent by political question rulings comes at a
cost. The justices dislike acknowledging that some of their decisions, were they to make them, would be ultra vires and thus of
questionable legal authority.
With the connection of the Supreme Court’s administration
of the political question doctrine to the ultra vires conundrum
thus laid bare, this Article turns to its third major aim: to explore
how our system would and ought to respond to the questions arising from claims by one of the political branches that the judiciary
has acted ultra vires. In a showdown, would and should the
Court’s certification that it had properly exercised its jurisdiction
necessarily prevail? Whether a court has so drastically overstepped is, I shall argue, the ultimate species of political question—one that officials of other branches and, in the final accounting, the citizens of the United States must decide for themselves.23
The Article comprises five Parts. Part I elaborates the ultra
vires conundrum. With the ultra vires conundrum exposed,
Part II maps some varieties of political questions and discusses
the diverse senses in which they are jurisdictional. Even in cases
presenting political questions, Part II argues, the courts remain
available to identify and check ultra vires action by other
branches if it should occur. Part III reviews traditional theories
of the political question doctrine and argues that none is individually adequate. A pluralist account is needed. With Part III having recognized multiple doctrinal foundations for judicial invocation of the political question doctrine, Part IV raises and answers
the question why, as an empirical matter, the Supreme Court applies the doctrine to so few cases. Its response emphasizes the ultra vires conundrum and the Supreme Court’s reluctance to issue
reminders that some imaginable rulings on the merits of constitutional disputes would overstep the limits of judicial power.
Part V discusses appropriate responses to the ultra vires conundrum, including in cases of possible ultra vires action by the judicial branch. It argues that whether judicial action is ultra vires
and therefore undeserving of obedience constitutes the ultimate
political question and proposes normative guidelines for addressing that question if it should ever arise.

23 See, for example, Coleman v Miller, 307 US 433, 459 (1939) (Black concurring)
(arguing that Congress’s power over the process of constitutional amendment is “exclusive” and Congress would be “under no duty to accept the pronouncements upon that exclusive power by this Court”).
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I. THE ULTRA VIRES CONUNDRUM
At the root of the political question doctrine and furnishing
the background to most of its applications is an enduring problem
of constitutional governance. The ultra vires conundrum unfolds
in three layers. At the surface level, when the Supreme Court
rules that an issue is a political question, it designates that issue
as beyond the jurisdiction of the courts to decide authoritatively.24
In other words, the Court determines that a judicial resolution on
the merits—for example, a ruling that the Senate had or had not
provided the kind of trial that the Constitution requires in the
Nixon case or that North Carolina had relied too much on partisan considerations in designing voting districts in Rucho—would
be ultra vires, or beyond the scope of judicial power under
Article III.25
The second layer of the ultra vires conundrum appears with
special vividness in Nixon and other cases involving “textually demonstrable commitment[s]” of constitutional issues to institutions other than the judiciary.26 It emerges if we now consider the
possibility of ultra vires action, not by the courts, but by the nonjudicial institution with authority to resolve an issue. Jurisdiction
to decide an issue typically and perhaps always includes the authority to commit mistakes.27 It signifies a power that can be exercised either correctly or incorrectly, at least within bounds.28
But there is a limit: recognition of jurisdiction in a nonjudicial
branch to interpret the Constitution does not vitiate the possibility of ultra vires action by that other branch in the purported exercise of its jurisdiction.29 Ultra vires action—which blurs along a
spectrum with mere error in the exercise of jurisdiction—defines
a practically, if not conceptually, necessary limit on the political
question doctrine.
24

See note 21 and accompanying text.
For another example, see Steel Co v Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 US 83,
101–02 (1998) (characterizing judicial action in the absence of subject matter jurisdiction
as “ultra vires”).
26 See Nixon, 506 US at 228–29.
27 See, for example, Estep v United States, 327 US 114, 122–23 (1946).
28 See, for example, In re Yamashita, 327 US 1, 8 (1946); Ng Fung Ho v White, 259
US 276, 284 (1922).
29 See Baker v Carr, 369 US 186, 217 (1962) (stressing that the courts “will not stand
impotent before an obvious instance of a manifestly unauthorized exercise of power”);
Louis Michael Seidman, The Secret Life of the Political Question Doctrine, 37 John Marshall L Rev 441, 456 (2004) (“[I]f [another branch’s] interpretive authority is not to be
completely unbounded, the Court still must have final authority to decide whether the
political branches are acting within an appropriate category.”).
25
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Among cases decided to date, perhaps the clearest example of
the Supreme Court’s policing of the outer boundaries of another
branch’s otherwise exclusive authority to interpret the Constitution involves the Guarantee Clause.30 In Luther v Borden31 and
again in Pacific States Telephone and Telegraph Co v Oregon,32
the Court affirmed that disputes under the Guarantee Clause
pose political questions.33 Notwithstanding those decisions,
Coyle v Smith34 invalidated a federal statute that forbade Oklahoma to move its state capital. In Coyle, the Court reasoned that
even though the Guarantee Clause conferred a broad scope of judicially unreviewable jurisdiction on Congress, Congress overreached the bounds of its authority when it sought to condition a
state’s admission to the Union on terms that would deprive it of
equal status with other states.35
The same logic would apply to disputes under other provisions that the Supreme Court has identified as conferring judicially unreviewable authority on other branches.36 For example,
30 US Const Art IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion;
and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be
convened) against domestic Violence.”).
31 48 US (7 How) 1 (1849).
32 223 US 118 (1912).
33 See Luther, 48 US (7 How) at 42; Pacific States, 223 US at 150.
34 221 US 559 (1911).
35 Id at 567–68 (citations omitted):

The argument that Congress derives from the duty of “guaranteeing to each
State in this Union a republican form of government,” power to impose restrictions upon a new State which deprives it of equality with other members of
the Union, has no merit. It may imply the duty of such new State to provide itself
with such state government, and impose upon Congress the duty of seeing that
such form is not changed to one anti-republican, but it obviously does not confer
power to admit a new State which shall be any less a State than those which
compose the Union.
36 Commentators have made the same point about other constitutional provisions
that give rise to political questions. For example, the Supreme Court has held that
whether a constitutional amendment has been validly ratified is a political question, committed by the Constitution for resolution by Congress. See Coleman v Miller, 307 US 433,
455–56 (1939). Accepting the Court’s ruling, Professor Laurence Tribe maintains—
through the device of a rhetorical question—that Coleman’s holding could not plausibly
extend to plainly ultra vires action:

Could anyone really believe, for example, that a court would feel bound to treat
the [E]qual [R]ights [A]mendment (ERA) as part of the Constitution if Congress
determined that the thirty-five states that had ratified the amendment as of
July 1, 1982, constituted the “three fourths” of fifty required by [A]rticle V?
Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, A Constitution We Are Amending: In Defense of a Restrained
Judicial Role, 97 Harv L Rev 433, 433 (1983).
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imagine that the Senate, following Nixon, adopted the position
that its power to “try” impeachments included the authority to
sentence impeached officials to hard labor or to seize their assets
as a punishment for high crimes and misdemeanors—in flat contravention of Article I, § 3, clause 7, which provides that “Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to
removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any
Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States.”37 It
seems intuitive that the Senate would not merely err, but exceed
its jurisdiction, if, at the conclusion of an impeachment trial, it
purported to impose a punishment beyond removal from office.38
A similar but more limited conclusion emerges from reflection on Rucho, the only case so far in which the Supreme Court
has characterized a claim of individual constitutional rights as
presenting a political question solely due to the absence of judicially manageable standards. Despite the majority’s emphatic determination that whether, and if so when, partisan gerrymanders
violate the Constitution is a political question, the unreviewable
discretion of state authorities is bounded by judicially manageable standards that forbid gerrymanders that violate one-person,
one-vote principles.39 To put the point in more conceptual terms,
although cases finding a lack of judicially manageable standards
acknowledge an absence of enforceable limits on legislative discretion along one dimension, other judicially enforceable limits on
legislative power may remain.
In sum, a ruling by the Supreme Court that exercises of authority by another branch under a particular constitutional provision give rise to political questions does not establish that courts
could never entertain challenges to the other branch’s assertions
of purported authority. Rather, the Court’s denomination of a
question as political typically establishes only that the judicial
branch has no role in reviewing the action of another branch either within bounded limits or along a dimension where judicially
enforceable limits are singularly lacking.
Recognition of the need for judicial policing of the bounds of
other branches’ jurisdiction to resolve political questions exposes
the third and most fundamental layer of the ultra vires problem.
The irresolvable conundrum of the political question doctrine

37
38
39

US Const Art I, § 3, cl 7.
See note 29.
Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533, 557–58 (1964).
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arises because the Supreme Court, in labeling a question as a political question, acknowledges and symbolizes limits on its jurisdiction by affirming that for it to attempt to resolve a particular
question on the merits would be ultra vires.40 Yet the Court—
which is a fallible institution—sometimes must risk engaging in
ultra vires action in order to stop ultra vires action by other
branches.
As I explain more fully below, the possibility of ultra vires
judicial action is real. So is the question of how other institutions
should respond to what they believe to be ultra vires judicial action—an issue that I take up in Part V. For now, it is enough to
draw two provisional conclusions about the implications of the ultra vires problem for traditional understandings of the political
question doctrine. First, political question rulings are less absolute and categorical than is often imagined. Although eschewing
jurisdiction to correct mere errors by other branches in political
question cases, courts typically retain jurisdiction to police the
outer boundaries of other institutions’ authority if other institutions should stray ultra vires. Second, recognition that the reach
and limits of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction interact with other
branches’ jurisdiction, and that other institutions are capable of
ultra vires action in cases that the courts have characterized as
presenting political questions, imbues the political question doctrine with a myriad of complexities that I explore in subsequent
parts.
II. THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE: CONCEPTUAL
FOUNDATIONS
Among the mysteries surrounding the political question doctrine is whether it is jurisdictional and, if so, what the term “jurisdictional” imports. The Supreme Court recurrently describes
the political question doctrine as jurisdictional.41 In doing so,
moreover, it appears to contemplate that the existence of a political question implies an absence of subject matter jurisdiction
that requires the dismissal of a suit or claim as immediately and
categorically as would a determination that the plaintiff lacks

40 See Steel Co, 523 US at 101–02 (concluding that the purported exercise of judicial
power beyond the bounds of Article III “is, by very definition, for a court to act ultra vires”).
41 See note 21 and accompanying text.
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standing or that a dispute is moot.42 By contrast, a few commentators have insisted that the political question doctrine is not jurisdictional at all.43
Viewed in light of the ultra vires conundrum, the question
whether the political question doctrine is jurisdictional assumes
a new intricacy. The ultra vires conundrum, which arises from
competing claims of jurisdiction to resolve issues authoritatively,
highlights the possibility that not every identification of a question as political necessarily signals an absence of judicial subject
matter jurisdiction. Sometimes identification of a political question marks a limit on subject matter jurisdiction over a lawsuit
and requires dismissal without further action or inquiry. Other
times, however, a court, recognizing that an issue lies within the
jurisdiction of another branch to decide, might accept the other
branch’s decision as a basis for either granting or denying relief
on the merits. A still-valuable reminder of the multifariousness
of the political question doctrine comes from its canonical formulation in Baker v Carr:44
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found [1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility
of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence
to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.

42 See, for example, Massachusetts v EPA, 549 US 497, 516 (2007) (affirming “familiar learning that no justiciable ‘controversy’ exists when parties seek adjudication of a
political question”).
43 See John Harrison, The Political Question Doctrines, 67 Am U L Rev 457, 460, 481
(2017) (arguing that the political question doctrine is not jurisdictional and that it has
always consisted of two strains: a set of scenarios in which another branch’s application of
law to fact is final and a rule against “[r]emedies that would direct political discretion”).
See also Henkin, 85 Yale L J at 600–01 (cited in note 1) (arguing that many cases labeled
as finding political questions instead uphold governmental action on the merits or deny
equitable remedies).
44 369 US 186 (1962).
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Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case
at bar, there should be no dismissal for non-justiciability on
the ground of a political question’s presence.45
More recent cases—including Nixon, Zivotofsky v Clinton,46
and Rucho—seem to focus almost exclusively on just two of the
Baker criteria: textually demonstrable commitments to other
branches and a lack of judicially manageable standards.47 But no
subsequent case purports to revise Baker in any respect.
In correcting misconceptions that have grown up around the
Supreme Court’s insistence that political question determinations are jurisdictional, this Part emphasizes two related points.
First, there are diverse kinds of political questions, of which I single out three: political questions arising from other branches’ decisions not involving constitutional interpretation, constitutional
questions committed to nonjudicial branches, and constitutional
questions for which courts cannot identify judicially manageable
standards. Second, the jurisdictional label has different implications in different kinds of cases.
A. Political Questions Arising from Other Branches’ Decisions
Not Involving Constitutional Interpretation
In the modern Supreme Court’s preoccupation with political
questions that both involve constitutional interpretation and require the dismissal of claims to relief as beyond the jurisdiction of
courts to entertain, the justices appear to have lost sight of a more
old-fashioned category. Political questions in the old-fashioned
sense typically arise as courts resolve disputed, subconstitutional
claims to relief on the merits and accord finality to the determinations of another branch.48 An example comes from Williams v
Suffolk Insurance Co.49 Liability under an insurance contract arguably depended on whether the Falkland Islands came within
the sovereign jurisdiction of Argentina.50 In pronouncing that the
status of the Falkland Islands was a political question, the Court
signified only that it must accept the executive’s negative decision

45
46
47
48
49
50

Id at 217.
566 US 189 (2012).
See Nixon, 506 US at 228; Zivotofsky, 566 US at 195; Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2494.
See Harrison, 67 Am U L Rev at 460 (cited in note 43).
38 US (13 Pet) 415 (1839).
Id at 417.
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as conclusive.51 The Court lacked jurisdiction, in the sense of authority, to decide for itself a question on which the political
branches had already spoken. Nevertheless, the Court retained
subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim to relief.52
Kennett v Chambers53 furnishes another example of a political
question ruling that did not involve a constitutional issue and did
not signify an absence of subject matter jurisdiction. The dispute
again involved a contract, the enforceability of which depended
on whether Texas was at relevant times an independent state or
a rebellious Mexican province.54 The Supreme Court ruled that
Texas’s status was a political question and that until the executive branch recognized Texas as an independent state, “the judicial tribunals of the country were bound to consider” that it remained part of Mexico, a country with which the United States
had diplomatic relations.55 Based on that determination, the
Court found that the contract was void and unenforceable but not
that the dispute was beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to resolve.56
If a jurisdictional bar applies in the category of cases presenting subconstitutional issues that nonjudicial departments are empowered to decide authoritatively, it involves jurisdiction to make
independent determinations of particular issues, not jurisdiction
over the parties or the subject matter of a dispute, the absence of
which would preclude any judicial decision on the merits.57
B. Constitutional Questions Committed to Other Branches
Most modern political question disputes have turned on
whether the Constitution entrusts the resolution of constitutional
questions to an institution other than the judiciary, typically
through a textually demonstrable commitment of decision-making
authority. Nixon exemplifies this possibility.58 No one disputed
51

See id at 420.
Id at 422.
53 55 US (14 How) 38 (1852).
54 Id at 41.
55 Id at 50–51.
56 Id at 52.
57 See Harrison, 67 Am U L Rev at 486 (cited in note 43) (distinguishing subject
matter jurisdiction and jurisdiction over the parties from authority to make independent
determinations of issues resolved by other institutions).
58 See Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The Transformation and Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine, 80 NC L Rev 1203, 1210
(2002) (explaining the Nixon Court’s conclusion that “the word ‘Try’ in the Impeachment
Trial Clause does not provide an identifiable textual limit on the authority which is committed to the Senate”) (citation omitted).
52
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that the Senate could not validly convict Chief Judge Walter
Nixon and remove him from office without “try[ing]” him.59 But in
response to a complaint that the Senate had failed to conduct the
type of trial that the Constitution requires, the Supreme Court
determined that Article I, § 3, clause 6 represented a “textually
demonstrable commitment” of authority to the Senate to determine the scope of the Senate’s obligations.60 According to the
Court, the Senate had implicitly determined that its procedures
met the constitutional requirement, and its determination was
dispositive, even if possibly erroneous.61
Although Nixon is widely read as holding that the Supreme
Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction,62 one could quarrel with
this characterization, as Professor John Harrison notably has.63
Harrison begins with a point that seems indisputably correct.
Characterization of a constitutional question as a political question based on its commitment to a branch other than the judiciary
does not necessarily preclude judicial jurisdiction over cases, or
claims within cases, that include political questions—even when
resolving the political questions requires constitutional
interpretation.64
Luther v Borden illustrates the point. Luther was a trespass
action in which a central issue involved whether the longstanding
59
60
61

See Nixon, 506 US at 229–30.
Id at 228–29.
See Seidman, 37 John Marshall L Rev at 453 (cited in note 29):

[T]he political question doctrine does work only when, but for the doctrine, the
losing party in a law suit would have been victorious. Thus, a judge relying on
the political question doctrine must start by asserting that a right has been violated. But it is precisely in the cases where the political question doctrine makes
a difference that the judge must also deprive the right of efficacy. Put differently,
giving the political question doctrine work to do always means frustrating the
work that rights would otherwise do.
62 See, for example, Rebecca L. Brown, When Political Questions Affect Individual
Rights: The Other Nixon v United States, 1993 S Ct Rev 125, 128 (reading Nixon as holding
that “the question whether the Senate breached its duty to ‘try’ Nixon is a nonjusticiable
political question” and that “the Court will not consider any case presenting an issue about
whether the procedures used during an impeachment trial comported with any standard
of adequacy associated with notions of what constitutes a ‘trial’”); Michael J. Gerhardt,
Rediscovering Nonjusticiability: Judicial Review of Impeachments After Nixon, 44 Duke L
J 231, 244 (1994) (observing that “the determination of a political question requires a court
to make the kind of decision it must routinely make in adjudicating preliminary issues
about the ripeness or mootness of a lawsuit, personal jurisdiction, and standing”).
63 Harrison, 67 Am U L Rev at 481, 504 (cited in note 43) (interpreting Nixon as
according “finality” to a determination by the Senate, not finding an absence of subject
matter jurisdiction).
64 See id at 460–68.
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government of Rhode Island was a constitutionally lawful one under the Guarantee Clause,65 which provides that “[t]he United
States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive
(when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.”66 The Supreme Court found that question to be political in
character, and committed to Congress by the Guarantee Clause,
with Congress in turn having authorized the president by statute
to call out the militia as might be necessary to suppress insurrection.67 Because the Court believed that the political branches had
implicitly resolved the disputed question against the plaintiff, it
affirmed an order of dismissal, but it did so on the merits.68 In
ordering dismissal on the merits, the Court accepted, and viewed
itself as bound by, the decision of the political branches concerning the lawful status of the Rhode Island government under the
Guarantee Clause.69 If the political branches had reached a different decision, the case would still have turned on a political question, but Luther’s trespass action against a defendant who
pleaded a defense of state authorization for his actions might
have succeeded.
The idea of the Supreme Court being bound by other
branches’ constitutional interpretations—under the Impeachment Trial Clause or the Guarantee Clause, for example—strikes
some commentators as anomalous.70 But those critics of the political question doctrine purport to find anomaly or mystery where
none exists, provided that one keeps the ultra vires limitation on
judicial reliance on other branches’ determinations in mind. Under a variety of long-established doctrines, courts, including the
Supreme Court, can sometimes be bound by the rulings of other
institutions, including on constitutional matters, as long as the
other institutions act within the scope of their jurisdiction. One
65

Luther, 48 US (7 How) at 34–35, 42.
US Const Art IV, § 4.
67 See Luther, 48 US (7 How) at 42–44.
68 Id at 46–47.
69 Id.
70 See, for example, Redish, 79 Nw U L Rev at 1059–60 (cited in note 1) (“Once we
make the initial assumption that judicial review plays a legitimate role in a constitutional
democracy, we must abandon the political question doctrine, in all of its manifestations.”);
Brown, 1993 S Ct Rev at 131 (cited in note 62) (“The assumption that provides the necessary logical premise to each of the steps in the Court’s [political question] analysis is antithetical to the system of separated powers and checks and balances embodied in the
Constitution.”).
66
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example comes from the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion,
under which courts sometimes view themselves as bound by the
legal and even the constitutional determinations of other tribunals or institutions, provided that those institutions acted within
the bounds of their jurisdiction and afforded a fair opportunity for
the litigation of disputed claims or issues.71
Sometimes, moreover, the law requires courts to treat nonjudicial rulings as conclusive. An example emerges from the traditions of habeas corpus, pursuant to which a court would inquire
only into whether a detaining authority had jurisdiction to effect
a detention.72 Within the traditional framework, whether a soldier was lawfully held or incarcerated in wartime lay within the
jurisdiction of military authorities to determine, even though military authorities could obviously err. A court would issue the writ
to inquire into the legality of a detention, but it would constitute
an adequate return if the respondent reported that the detention
had occurred pursuant to the order of an official with lawful authority to impose wartime restraints or to try and punish alleged
violations of the laws of war.73 If satisfied that detaining authorities had acted within the scope of their jurisdiction, courts would
not inquire further into whether the respondents had correctly
resolved the questions of law or fact on which their decisions
rested.74 Nevertheless, the judicial denial of the writ would represent a decision on the merits, not a dismissal of the petition for
want of jurisdiction.
71 See, for example, Allen v McCurry, 449 US 90, 101 (1980) (finding no sign that
when Congress enacted 42 USC § 1983, it “intended to allow relitigation of federal issues
decided after a full and fair hearing in a state court simply because the state court’s decision may have been erroneous”); Migra v Warren City School District Board of Education,
465 US 75, 83–84 (1984) (extending Allen to claim preclusion).
72 See, for example, Ex parte Reed, 100 US 13, 23 (1879) (“Having had such jurisdiction, [the tribunal’s] proceedings cannot be collaterally impeached for any mere error or
irregularity, if there were such, committed within the sphere of its authority.”); Dynes v
Hoover, 61 US (20 How) 65, 74 (1857) (“As the [military] court had jurisdiction, no errors
committed in its exercise can be reviewed or corrected by this court.”). See also Richard H.
Fallon Jr, John Manning, Daniel Meltzer, and David Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s The
Federal Courts and the Federal System 1238 (Foundation 7th ed 2015) (“[P]recedents often
state that habeas review is limited to questions of jurisdiction.”).
73 See Ludecke v Watkins, 335 US 160, 173 (1948) (concluding “that full responsibility for the just exercise of [the] great power” to detain and remove enemy aliens “may
validly be left where the Congress has constitutionally placed it—on the President of the
United States”); Moyer v Peabody, 212 US 78, 85 (1909) (noting that “[p]ublic danger warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial process” in review of executive detention during a period of insurrection).
74 See Johnson v Eisentrager, 339 US 763, 775 (1950) (stating that “[o]nce these jurisdictional elements have been determined, courts will not inquire into any other issue
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Furthermore, and perhaps more to the point for current purposes, a return to the writ asserting that a custodian had lawful
jurisdiction to detain a prisoner would not be utterly conclusive.
A court would always have jurisdiction to determine, at the least,
whether an assertion of jurisdiction by a particular official under
particular circumstances was lawful.75 For example, if executive
jurisdiction to detain a civilian without trial depended on whether
the civilian was a citizen of a country at war with the United
States or whether the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus had
been validly suspended, courts would ascertain whether those
predicates were satisfied. And the assertion of judicial jurisdiction, in turn, created the possibility of competing claims of ultra
vires action by the executive and judicial branches. That possibility was famously realized in Ex parte Merryman,76 which presented a question about the validity of a purported suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus. I discuss Merryman extensively below.77
C. Constitutional Questions for Which Courts Cannot Identify
Judicially Manageable Standards
The Supreme Court denominates a further set of questions
as political based on an absence of judicially manageable standards for resolving them. Questions involving an absence of judicially manageable standards lie beyond the jurisdiction of the federal courts in a different way and for different reasons from those
that apply in cases involving textually demonstrable commitments to other branches.
As Rucho illustrates, this category need not involve a commitment of interpretive responsibility to another branch. In
Rucho, it is implausible to imagine that the Constitution assigns
responsibility to state legislatures to identify and remedy the

as to [an enemy alien’s] internment”); Ex parte Quirin, 317 US 1, 25 (1942) (rejecting the
contention that, in reviewing the trial of enemy combatants before a military commission,
a reviewing court can consider issues unrelated to the “basis of the Commission’s authority”).
75 See, for example, Eisentrager, 339 US at 775, citing Ludecke, 335 US at 160:
The resident enemy alien is constitutionally subject to summary arrest, internment and deportation whenever a “declared war” exists. Courts will entertain
his plea for freedom from Executive custody only to ascertain the existence of a
state of war and whether he is an alien enemy and so subject to the Alien Enemy
Act. Once these jurisdictional elements have been determined, courts will not
inquire into any other issue as to his internment.
76
77

17 F Cases 144 (CC D Md 1861).
See Part IV.B.
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equal protection and First Amendment violations that the plaintiffs alleged. In addition, the Supreme Court expressly rejected a
suggestion that “through the Elections Clause, the Framers set
aside electoral issues such as the one before us as questions that
only Congress can resolve.”78 Nevertheless, the Court found an
Article III bar to the exercise of judicial jurisdiction to identify
constitutional violations and enforce constitutional norms.79
In this category of cases, it seems plausible to think of a political question ruling as signifying an absence of judicial subject
matter jurisdiction. Upon finding that political gerrymandering
claims present political questions, the judicial role terminates,
without occasion to enforce the constitutional decisions of a nonjudicial institution and without further worries about how nonjudicial institutions exercise their authority. Even here, however,
there are complications in plumbing the outer boundaries of the
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction and in identifying the point at which
they materialize.
The Supreme Court appears never to have given a full explication of the concept of judicially manageable standards.80 But if
we seek to reconstruct its content from the Court’s cases—including but not limited to discussions of the political question doctrine—two central points emerge. First, to count as judicially
manageable, a standard must give intelligible guidance and yield
reasonably consistent, predictable outcomes when applied by different courts to different cases.81 Second, the term judicially manageable standards is ambiguous: it can refer either to the inputs
or to the outputs of constitutional adjudication.82
Many constitutional provisions—if viewed solely in light of
text and history—would fail to qualify as judicially manageable
standards in the input sense. Taken by themselves, they are too
vague.83 Crucially, however, the modern Supreme Court, upon
finding that a constitutional provision fails to furnish a judicially
78

Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2495.
See id at 2493, 2498–2506.
80 For discussion, see Richard H. Fallon Jr, Judicially Manageable Standards and
Constitutional Meaning, 119 Harv L Rev 1275, 1281–82 (2006).
81 See id at 1287–90.
82 See id at 1282–83 (defining a judicially manageable standard as an input when an
existing standard is applied to a constitutional controversy, and as an output “in any case
in which a court successfully devises a [new standard] that can thereafter be used to implement a constitutional provision”).
83 See id at 1283 (“Viewed as an input in light of which a court might be asked to
resolve constitutional cases, the bare language of the Equal Protection Clause is not a
judicially manageable standard in political gerrymandering disputes.”).
79
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manageable standard, does not typically conclude immediately
that an issue is nonjusticiable. Instead, when confronted with
troublingly underdeterminate inputs, the Court proceeds to a second stage, in which it seeks to devise tests or formulae of the kind
that dominate the landscape of modern constitutional law—a
three-part test of congressional power under the Commerce
Clause,84 the “strict judicial scrutiny” formula for gauging the permissibility of infringements on fundamental rights,85 a plethora
of standards for identifying violations of the free speech guarantee,86 and so forth. In other words, when a constitutional provision
is not a judicially manageable standard in the input sense, the
Court assumes the partly creative, consequence-sensitive task of
developing judicially manageable standards in the output sense.87
Chief Justice John Roberts’s opinion in Rucho illustrates the
two-stage process, though in a context in which the second resulted in failure. In appraising the challengers’ complaints under
constitutional provisions that included the rights-conferring
Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment, the Chief
Justice reviewed the efforts of the plaintiffs and then of the dissenting opinion to devise standards by which to identify constitutionally impermissible partisan gerrymanders.88 Tellingly, he did
not criticize efforts to fashion judicially manageable standards.
Instead, he adjudged that those efforts fell short of success. If the
Court were to wade into the political controversies in which adjudication of challenges to gerrymanders would enmesh it, he
thought it “vital . . . that the Court act only in accord with especially clear standards”89 that he found lacking in the proposals
that the plaintiffs and the dissenting justices advanced.
Although much more might be said about the branch of the
political question doctrine that involves an absence of judicially
manageable standards, I venture only three brisk comments, all
84 See, for example, United States v Morrison, 529 US 598, 608 (2000) (noting that
“modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence has ‘identified three broad categories of activity
that Congress may regulate under its commerce power’”), quoting United States v Lopez,
514 US 549, 558 (1995).
85 On the historical emergence of strict judicial scrutiny, see generally Richard H.
Fallon Jr, Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L Rev 1267 (2007).
86 See, for example, Reed v Town of Gilbert, 135 S Ct 2218, 2226 (2015) (stating the
relevant test for content-discriminatory regulations); Brandenburg v Ohio, 395 US 444,
447 (1969) (same with respect to incitements to violence); New York Times Co v Sullivan,
376 US 254, 279–80 (1964) (same with respect to libel actions brought by public officials).
87 See Fallon, 119 Harv L Rev at 1281–97 (cited in note 80).
88 Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2497–98.
89 Id at 2498.
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related to the ultra vires dilemma and the complex jurisdictional
issues that it highlights. First, the determination that the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction based on an absence of judicially
manageable standards can come only at the conclusion of a judicial effort to devise judicially manageable standards in the output
sense. If a political question ruling results in a dismissal for want
of subject matter jurisdiction, it does not come until the Court involves itself intently in a case not merely to determine what the
parties have pleaded or proved, or even what the law establishes
or requires, but also to attempt to craft judicially manageable
standards. The Court’s initial engagement in the search for judicially manageable standards—even if such standards do not perfectly reflect the Constitution’s “meaning”—testifies to the importance of the judicial role in checking constitutional overreach
by nonjudicial officials.90
Second, there is a sense in which the judicial conclusion that
judicially manageable standards are lacking represents a judicial
failure: despite best efforts, the Supreme Court pronounces that
it came up short in its effort to craft standards on which the enforcement of constitutional rights depends. To be sure, the Court
views itself as subject to role-based constraints that dictate the
embrace of failure under some circumstances.91 It would be ultra
vires for the Court to establish rules of decision that were too far
removed from the Constitution’s language, history, and ascertainable purposes. But the categorical determination that all challenges to partisan gerrymanders must be dismissed in all cases
presents problems of its own. In Rucho, Chief Justice Roberts did
not attempt to prove an impossibility theorem or otherwise establish that the devising of judicially manageable standards was or
would forever be impossible. Rather, although he did not say so
expressly, the chief justice appears to have determined that the
costs of allowing plaintiffs to keep on proposing new standards for
gauging the permissibility of partisan gerrymanders were—pursuant to some undisclosed scale—not worth the benefits. It is not
merely smart-alecky to observe that the Court has never articulated judicially manageable second-order standards for determining when proposed first-order standards are judicially manageable.

90 See Fallon, 119 Harv L Rev at 1317 (cited in note 80) (emphasizing the existence
of “permissible disparities between constitutional meaning and implementing doctrine”).
91 For further discussion, see notes 108, 197 and accompanying text.
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Third, to enter into the domain of admittedly opinionated
comment, I believe that Rucho’s analysis was mistaken for reasons that attention to the ultra vires conundrum helps to highlight. Although contemplating that the pursuit of partisan advantage in the drawing of district lines might in principle go too
far and thereby violate constitutional norms, the Supreme Court
held in Rucho that the judiciary could not identify and thus could
not prohibit or remedy even ultra vires action along the dimension of merely excessive partisanship (that did not, for example,
involve racial discrimination or an abridgment of one-person, onevote principles).92 Given the absence of reasonably clear secondorder standards for marking proposed first-order rules as judicially manageable or not, one might expect the Court to exhibit
special hesitation before concluding that the federal judiciary cannot identify even the most egregious violations of constitutional
norms by districting authorities. Instead, the Court bent, erroneously, in the opposite direction.
In taking the anomalous step of dismissing a constitutional
complaint as presenting a political question solely because it
thought the task of identifying individual rights “beyond judicial
capabilities,”93 Chief Justice Roberts—as I have noted—insisted
that any judicially formulated test for identifying unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders must be “especially clear.”94 A
standard that would suffice as adequately judicially manageable
under other circumstances would not do in Rucho, he implied, for
reasons involving the need of the judiciary to maintain public
trust in its nonpartisan character. Quoting Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion in Vieth, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that “[w]ith
uncertain limits [guiding judicial decision-making about when
partisan gerrymandering went too far], intervening courts—even
when proceeding with best intentions—would risk assuming political, not legal, responsibility for a process that often produces
ill will and distrust.”95 Chief Justice Roberts spoke even more explicitly in the oral argument in an earlier case, Gill v Whitford,96
that the Court ultimately resolved on standing grounds. There,
he worried aloud that adjudicating gerrymandering challenges

92
93
94
95
96

Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2506–07.
Id at 2509 (Kagan dissenting).
Id at 2498 (majority).
Id, quoting Vieth, 541 US at 307 (Kennedy concurring in the judgment).
138 S Ct 1916 (2018).
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would entail courts “decid[ing] in every case whether the Democrats win or the Republicans win.”97 Given that premise, he conjectured that if the courts became involved, “the intelligent man
on the street is going to say [that if the Supreme Court rules for
the Democrats] . . . [i]t must be because the Supreme Court preferred the Democrats over the Republicans.”98 If so, one could infer, Chief Justice Roberts feared that “the intelligent man on the
street” would lose respect for the Court.
I do not question that it can sometimes be appropriate for the
Supreme Court to take account of likely public perceptions in appraising whether proposed standards are judicially manageable.
But such considerations should matter only insofar as the Court
can respond to them without defaulting on its more urgent responsibility to protect and promote—within bounds allowed by
law—the moral and political legitimacy of the constitutional system as a whole.99 As a property of both political regimes and judicial decisions, moral legitimacy signifies entitlement to respect or
obedience.100 It is an especially important concept under circumstances of political division. None of us can expect political institutions to reach decisions that we think are ideally just in all
cases. In light of inevitable shortfall, moral legitimacy—or respectworthiness—becomes the critical concept both in justifying
the exercise of political power and in grounding claims of political
obligation.
Moral legitimacy can have multiple and diverse sources, including substantive justice and procedural fairness.101 But few
would deny that the moral legitimacy of constitutional government in the United States depends vitally on wellsprings in political democracy. In cases of reasonable disagreement, it is presumptively fair for the majority to rule. Even when we disagree,
we can all understand why decisions reached through reasonably
fair democratic processes have a presumptive claim to our respect
and obedience.
In my view, the Supreme Court majority in Rucho failed to
reckon adequately with the threat that partisan gerrymandering

97

Transcript of Oral Argument, Gill v Whitford, No 16-1161, *36–38 (US filed Oct 3, 2017).
Id at *38.
99 See Richard H. Fallon Jr, Law and Legitimacy in the Supreme Court 41–46
(Belknap 2018).
100 See id at 23.
101 See id at 29.
98
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poses to the integrity and ultimately the moral legitimacy of
American political democracy. As Justice Elena Kagan wrote:
[T]he need for judicial review is at its most urgent in cases
like these. “For here, politicians’ incentives conflict with voters’ interests, leaving citizens without any political remedy
for their constitutional harms.” Those harms arise because
politicians want to stay in office. No one can look to them for
effective relief.102
With regard to Chief Justice Roberts’s worries about the
Court putting its sociological legitimacy at risk if the public perceived it as taking sides between Democrats and Republicans, I
further agree with Justice Kagan in sounding more paramount
themes of legal and moral legitimacy: “Part of the Court’s role” in
our system of government “is to defend [our democracy’s] foundations” in a fair system of elections, even at the risk of some damage to the Court’s institutional stature in the eyes of some.103 By
forsaking the judicial role in upholding the democratic integrity
of our electoral system, the Rucho Court erred grievously.
***
If one tries to tally the senses in which the various categories
of political questions are jurisdictional in light of the ultra vires
conundrum, two conclusions emerge. First, although all three of
the categories of political questions that I have discussed in this
Part are jurisdictional in one sense or another, the label of subject
matter jurisdiction seems a bad fit, except possibly in cases involving dismissal solely due to an absence of judicially manageable standards. Otherwise, there is too much of a residual judicial
role in implementing decisions made by other branches within the
scope of their jurisdiction and in identifying and enforcing limits
against ultra vires action by other branches, even in the purported exercise of their jurisdiction to resolve political questions.
Second, because of the ultra vires conundrum, courts deciding political question cases must nevertheless confront questions
of jurisdiction in one or another sense of that sometimes chameleon-like term. In particular, the federal courts, centrally including
the Supreme Court, inescapably need to gauge the outer limits of

102 Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2523 (Kagan dissenting) (citation omitted), quoting Gill, 138 S
Ct at 1941 (Kagan concurring).
103 Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2525 (Kagan dissenting).
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both their jurisdiction and that of other branches or institutions
as defined by the concept of ultra vires action.
III. BASES FOR DENOMINATING QUESTIONS AS POLITICAL
QUESTIONS: A PLURALISTIC ACCOUNT
Justices, judges, and commentators have offered a variety of
theories specifying proper grounds for identifying political questions, sometimes with the aim of rejecting bases that others have
defended. This Part first examines the three leading theories—
which are conventionally labeled as classical, functional, and prudential—of why and when the courts should determine that constitutional disputes pose political questions. All have some resonance in the doctrine, but none can explain everything, especially
once the ultra vires conundrum and the various senses in which
political question determinations can be jurisdictional come into
the picture. Accordingly, without pretending to offer a full positive theory that would explain all decided cases, this Part
sketches the outlines of a pluralistic account.
A. The Classical Theory
The classical theory holds that identifications of questions as
political questions are continuous with, rather than deviations
from, the ordinary processes of constitutional interpretation that
more customarily result in rulings on the merits.104 Professor Herbert Wechsler offered the paradigmatic articulation of this theory:
[A]ll the [political question] doctrine can defensibly imply is
that the courts are called upon to judge whether the Constitution has committed to another agency of government the
autonomous determination of the issue raised, a finding that
itself requires an interpretation.
...
[T]he only proper judgment that may lead to an abstention
from decision is that the Constitution has committed the determination of the issue to another agency of government
than the courts. Difficult as it may be to make that judgment
wisely, . . . what is involved is in itself an act of constitutional
104 See, for example, Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 96 (Foundation
2d ed 1988); Barkow, 102 Colum L Rev at 336 (cited in note 22). The recurrently cited
sources for this view are Herbert Wechsler, Principles, Politics, and Fundamental Law
11–14 (Harvard 1961), and Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 Harv L Rev 1, 9 (1959).
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interpretation, to be made and judged by standards that
should govern the interpretive process generally. [That is totally] different from a broad discretion to abstain or intervene.105
As thus formulated, the classical view has two defining elements. First, it rejects the notion—especially as associated with
prudential theories, to be discussed below—that when identifying
questions as political, courts assert an “extra-ordinary” discretion106 to refuse to adjudicate disputes on grounds not explainable
in terms of “neutral principles.”107 Second, the classical theory assumes that courts in political question cases must adhere to constraints of judicial role that distinguish judicial from political,
pragmatic, or expediently consequence-driven reasoning.108
Framed in these terms, the classical view accepts that political question determinations are jurisdictional in some sense of
that term, identifying questions committed to other branches for
ultimate resolution. In a possible exemplification, Justice Hugo
Black’s concurring opinion in Coleman v Miller,109 which held that
the questions whether a state could ratify a constitutional amendment that it had previously rejected and whether a proposed
amendment lapses if not ratified within a reasonable time were
nonjusticiable political questions, reasoned that Article V grants
Congress “exclusive power over the amending process.”110 The
classical view is also compatible in principle with the result in
Nixon, which holds that Article I, § 3, clause 6 gives the Senate
sole authority to determine the procedural requisites of an impeachment trial.111
By contrast, Rucho broke sharply with the classical theory by
rejecting jurisdiction over a constitutional question, involving a
claim of individual rights, that the Constitution does not assign
to any other branch or institution via a textually demonstrable
105

Wechsler, 73 Harv L Rev at 7–9 (cited in note 104).
See Henkin, 85 Yale L J at 599 (cited in note 1) (contrasting “the ordinary respect
of the courts for the substantive decisions of the political branches, and extra-ordinary
deference to those branches’ determination that what they have done is constitutional”).
107 See Wechsler, 73 Harv L Rev at 19 (cited in note 104) (arguing that courts are
restricted to deciding cases based on “reasons that in their generality and their neutrality
transcend any immediate result that is involved”).
108 See id at 14–15 (distinguishing the instrumental uses for which principles are displayed in political reasoning from the “neutral” testing and application of principles that
should distinguish judicial reasoning).
109 307 US 433 (1939).
110 Id at 459 (Black concurring).
111 Nixon, 506 US at 229, 238.
106

1508

The University of Chicago Law Review

[87:1481

commitment of authority for constitutional interpretation.112 A
proponent of the classical theory might, of course, simply reject
Rucho as wrongly decided. Even if so, the conjunction of Rucho
with Nixon—which also highlights the central role that judicially
manageable standards play in modern political question analysis113—reveals a subtler but deeper challenge for the classical theory
in the current day. That challenge is to give an account of where
the boundaries of properly judicial reasoning—as distinguished
from political, pragmatic, or prudential reasoning—lie. As I explained in Part II.C, judicial efforts to craft judicially manageable
standards require a mix of pragmatic, predictive, and consequence-sensitive reasoning that fits uneasily with classical assumptions about role-based constraints on properly neutral and
principled judicial reasoning. As judicial reasoning depends increasingly heavily on what Baker v Carr referred to as “policy determination[s],”114 efforts to constrain the judicial role by reference to a classical conception of judicial reasoning seem
descriptively inadequate.115
B. Functional Theories
Functional theories emphasize comparative institutional
competence and, in particular, call for judicial renunciation of
decision-making authority in domains in which the courts would
112

Wechsler himself maintained that

the power of Congress to “make or alter” state regulations of the “Manner of
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,” implying as it does a power
to draw district lines or to prescribe the standards to be followed in defining
them, excludes the courts from passing on a constitutional objection to state gerrymanders, even if the Constitution can be thought to speak to this kind of
inequality.
Wechsler, 73 Harv L Rev at 8–9 (cited in note 104) (citations omitted). But this view has
subsequently been rejected by a long line of cases, as Rucho recognized:
Appellants suggest that, through the Elections Clause, the Framers set aside
electoral issues such as the one before us as questions that only Congress can
resolve. We do not agree. In two areas—one-person, one-vote and racial gerrymandering—our cases have held that there is a role for the courts with respect
to at least some issues that could arise from a State’s drawing of congressional
districts.
Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2495–96 (citation omitted), citing Wesberry v Sanders, 376 US 1 (1964);
Shaw v Reno, 509 US 630 (1993).
113 See Nixon, 506 US at 228–29 (noting that “the lack of judicially manageable standards may strengthen the conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable commitment to
a coordinate branch”).
114 Baker, 369 US at 217.
115 I say more about this difficulty in Part IV.A.
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lack requisite information or skills, especially relative to some
other institution.116 In modern cases, the Supreme Court most familiarly gestures toward the functional theory when it maintains
that it lacks authority to decide questions for which no judicially
manageable standards exist.117 Absent judicially manageable
standards, courts could not adjudicate well and, accordingly,
should vacate the field to institutions with greater presumptive
competence.
Recent cases, including Nixon and Rucho, have accorded
great significance to the presence or absence of judicially manageable standards—sometimes in conjunction with evidence of textual commitments (as in Nixon)—and have thus suggested that
the political question doctrine reflects functional considerations.
Even so, functional competence all by itself cannot account for the
existence and contents of the category of nonjusticiable political
questions. Of foremost significance, functional competence is seldom all-or-nothing. Accordingly, functional concerns can support
more- and less-exacting standards of judicial review on the merits
as readily as the classification of some questions as political questions that courts lack jurisdiction to resolve. For example, the Supreme Court typically insists that challenges to regulations of
conduct within the military and prisons will receive only very deferential judicial review, due to the courts’ limited functional competence, but not no judicial review at all.118
The contrast between judicial deference in military and
prison cases and the majority’s approach in Nixon and Rucho—
both of which cited an absence of judicially manageable standards
as a basis for eschewing judicial review altogether—raises questions on which the ultra vires conundrum sheds at least some

116 See, for example, Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A
Functional Analysis, 75 Yale L J 517, 566–97 (1966).
117 See, for example, Vieth, 541 US at 281 (Scalia) (plurality) (lamenting “[e]ighteen
years of judicial effort with virtually nothing to show for it”); Nixon, 506 US at 230 (concluding that language in the Impeachment Trial Clause “lacks sufficient precision to afford
any judicially manageable standard of review of the Senate’s actions”). See generally Fallon, 119 Harv L Rev 1275 (cited in note 80).
118 See, for example, Florence v Board of Chosen Freeholders, 566 US 318, 326 (2012)
(“The Court has confirmed the importance of deference to correctional officials and explained that a regulation impinging on an inmate’s constitutional rights must be upheld
‘if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’”), quoting Turner v Safley,
482 US 78, 89 (1987); Chappell v Wallace, 462 US 296, 305 (1983) (“[C]ourts are illequipped to determine the impact upon [military] discipline that any particular intrusion
upon military authority might have.”), quoting Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the
Military, 37 NYU L Rev 181, 187 (1962).
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light. As Justice Byron White emphasized in Nixon, the Senate
may have broad discretion in determining what constitutes
“try[ing]” impeachments, but the idea that there are no judicially
manageable standards by which to conduct any judicial review
whatsoever seems preposterous.119 Justice David Souter offered
one such standard: whatever else the Senate may do, it must not
decide by coin flip.120 Justice White similarly propounded the examples of a Senate judgment that an impeached official is simply
“a bad guy”121 and of a practice “of automatically entering a judgment of conviction whenever articles of impeachment” pass the
House of Representatives.122 Although these proposed markers of
bounds on Senate authority may seem caricatured, they show the
ease with which the Supreme Court could have affirmed that the
Senate’s constitutional determinations in conducting impeachment trials were judicially reviewable, albeit subject to a highly
deferential standard under which courts would rarely—if ever—
find constitutional violations.
Functional considerations could also have supported alternative approaches in Rucho, not just the one that the Court adopted.
Following the model of Justices White and Souter in Nixon, the
Rucho Court could have found no constitutional violation on the
merits, but without pronouncing categorically that all challenges
to partisan gerrymanders are nonjusticiable. Alternatively, the
Court could have adapted the approach that Justice Kennedy employed in an opinion concurring in the judgment in Vieth.
Whereas Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion would have pronounced categorically that when gerrymanders go “too far” is a
political question,123 Justice Kennedy held, more narrowly, that
although the plaintiffs had failed to articulate a judicially manageable standard under which they deserved to prevail, the possibility could not be foreclosed that other challengers in another
case could establish a constitutional violation by producing a test
fitted to the facts of their case.124
Nor should we necessarily accept that functional considerations dictated that the Rucho plaintiffs had to lose. Even taking
functional considerations into account, the Court could have ruled
119 Nixon, 506 US at 246–47 (White concurring in the judgment). See also Tushnet,
80 NC L Rev at 1210–11 (cited in note 58).
120 Nixon, 506 US at 253–54 (Souter concurring in the judgment).
121 Id at 239 (White concurring in the judgment) (quotation marks omitted).
122 Id at 246.
123 Veith, 541 US at 291 (Scalia) (plurality).
124 See id at 308–11 (Kennedy concurring in the judgment).
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for the challengers in Rucho even without propounding a generally applicable judicially manageable standard. Ironically, Chief
Justice Roberts supplied a model for analysis along these lines in
his opinion for the Court in National Federation of Independent
Businesses v Sebelius125 (NFIB). Among the issues in NFIB was
whether Congress overreached its powers under the Spending
Clause when it dictated that states must either expand their Medicaid programs or forfeit all Medicaid funds.126 As established by
prior cases, a mandate of that kind was constitutionally impermissible if coercive.127 In finding the challenged mandate coercive
and therefore invalid, Chief Justice Roberts did not purport to advance a judicially manageable standard for identifying coercive
exercises of the Spending Clause. “It is enough for today that
wherever [the] line may be” between constitutionally permissible
inducement and constitutionally forbidden coercion, “this statute
is surely beyond it,” he wrote.128
Dissenting in Rucho, Justice Kagan—whose analytical approach I applauded above—would have followed a variant of that
model. Wherever the line lay between constitutionally acceptable
and constitutionally excessive partisan gerrymanders, she
thought that the Court could have described the facts of the case
in full detail and concluded as “a first-cut answer [to the ‘how
much is too much’ question]: This much is too much.”129
Overall, I do not question that functional concerns are significant to the identification of political questions. Nevertheless,
functional criteria seem incapable of explaining when and why
the Court should prefer the denomination of questions as political
to the application of highly deferential standards of on-the-merits
review.
C. Prudential Theories
In contrast with both classical and functional theories, prudential theories insist that the political question doctrine involves
ad hoc judgments rooted in expediency, not “principled” determinations of textual commitment or generalizable assessments of

125
126
127
128
129

567 US 519 (2012).
Id at 542.
Id at 575–80 (Roberts) (plurality).
Id at 585.
Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2521 (Kagan dissenting).
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functional competence.130 Professor Alexander Bickel provided the
archetypal articulation of a prudential approach:
[O]nly by means of a play on words can the broad discretion
that the courts have in fact exercised be turned into an act of
constitutional interpretation governed by the general standards of the interpretive process. The political-question doctrine simply resists being domesticated in this fashion. There
is . . . something different about it, in kind not in degree;
something greatly more flexible, something of prudence, not
construction and not principle. And it is something that cannot exist within the four corners of Marbury v. Madison.
...
Such is the foundation, in both intellect and instinct, of the
political-question doctrine: the Court’s sense of lack of capacity, compounded in unequal parts of (a) the strangeness of the
issue and its intractability to principled resolution; (b) the
sheer momentousness of it, which tends to unbalance judicial
judgment; (c) the anxiety, not so much that the judicial judgment will be ignored, as that perhaps it should but will not
be; (d) finally (“in a mature democracy”), the inner vulnerability, the self-doubt of an institution which is electorally irresponsible and has no earth to draw strength from.131
Although no modern Supreme Court decisions rest on irreducibly prudential reasoning of the kind that Bickel championed,
a fair characterization of the themes that run through and help
to explain the Court’s political question decisions over time could
not wholly exclude reference to Bickelian prudentialism. Justices
Souter, Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor have all written either concurring or dissenting opinions in which they echoed concerns of

130 See Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the
Bar of Politics 125–26, 184 (Bobbs-Merrill 1962). See also Maurice Finkelstein, Judicial
Self-Limitation, 37 Harv L Rev 338, 344–45 (1924) (citations omitted):

[The political question doctrine] applies to all those matters of which the court,
at a given time, will be of the opinion that it is impolitic or inexpedient to take
jurisdiction. Sometimes this idea of inexpediency will result from the fear of the
vastness of the consequences that a decision on the merits might entail. Sometimes it will result from the feeling that the court is incompetent to deal with
the particular type of question involved. Sometimes it will be induced by the
feeling that the matter is “too high” for the courts. But always there will be a
weighing of considerations in the scale of political wisdom.
131

Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 125–26, 184 (cited in note 130).
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the kind that Bickel articulated, even if only in modulated form.
In Zivotofsky, in which the Court rejected political question objections in holding that the federal courts could determine the constitutionality of a statute requiring the State Department to list
“Israel” as the place of birth on the passports of Americans born
in Jerusalem, Justice Breyer dissented in light of “prudential considerations.”132 Among them, he cited the potential foreign policy
ramifications of having US passports denominate Jerusalem as
part of Israel when Jerusalem’s status is a subject of international
contention.133 Justice Sotomayor concurred in the majority’s disposition of Zivotofsky, but she wrote separately to emphasize that
in “rare case[s]” the Court should find questions nonjusticiable
based principally on prudential grounds.134 Justice Souter
sounded similar themes in his concurring opinion in Nixon.135 Justice Lewis Powell also affirmed his view that “the political-question doctrine rests in part on prudential concerns” in his concurring statement in Goldwater v Carter.136
Accordingly, a justice who wanted to characterize a question
as political based on largely ad hoc, prudential considerations
could find bases within existing law on which to do so. In taking
that stand, a justice would need to claim a robust, discretionary
power to identify limits on judicial jurisdiction. But prudential
theories of the political question distinguish themselves by insisting that such a power exists.
Nevertheless, it is nearly self-evident that the prudential
theory cannot account for all of the decided cases any more than
the classical and functional theories can. To cite just one example,
the Supreme Court’s decision in Nixon, which cited a “textually
demonstrable commitment” of judicially unreviewable authority
to the Senate and involved the removal from office of a largely
unknown federal judge, does not fit the mold.137 Nothing momentous was at stake. No case-specific exigency impelled the Justices
to decide as they did. Although the Court anticipated that a presidential impeachment might raise prudential considerations, its
ruling swept more broadly.

132

Zivotofsky, 566 US at 213 (Breyer dissenting).
Id at 216–18.
134 Id at 207 (Sotomayor concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
135 Nixon, 506 US at 252–54 (Souter concurring in the judgment).
136 444 US 996, 1000 (1979) (Powell concurring in the judgment to grant, vacate, and
remand the case with directions to dismiss).
137 Nixon, 506 US at 229.
133
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D. The Need for a Nonexclusive Theory
From the individual inadequacies of the classical, functional,
and prudential theories to explain all aspects of the political doctrine, a relatively straightforward conclusion follows: any descriptively adequate explanation of when, why, and how the Supreme
Court applies the political question doctrine would need to include a mix of elements. It is a partly distinct question whether
judicial practice that relies on combined aspects of the classical,
functional, and prudential theories can be justified as a matter of
law and judicial-role morality. I believe that the answer is yes,
provided that elements of the classical, functional, and prudential
theories are combined properly.
1. Descriptive analysis.
The failure of the Supreme Court to choose decisively among
the classical, functional, and prudential conceptions of the political question doctrine should be acknowledged on all sides. The
justices continue to rely on themes from all of the theories, despite
the claims of their proponents that they are distinct and sometimes irreconcilable alternatives. Insofar as the classical theory
can stand independently of functional and prudential theories, it
seems to provide the best account of the important doctrinal
strand involving textually demonstrable commitment of issues to
nonjudicial decision-makers. Yet the classical theory fails to provide a convincing explanation of political question reasoning that
turns on the presence or absence of judicially manageable standards, especially once the judicial role in devising judicially manageable standards is brought into view. By contrast, although
functional theories can partly—but only partly—explain the aspect of political question analysis that focuses on judicially manageable standards, inquiries into textually demonstrable commitments hinge centrally, even if not exclusively, on other kinds of
considerations. And prudential theories, though inadequate if offered as attempts to explain the entirety of the political question
doctrine, seem to capture some strains of political question reasoning distinctively well.
In addition, there is no good reason to try to keep the leading
theories hermetically sealed off from one another. The Supreme
Court’s Nixon opinion included a compendium of partly overlapping rationales—and, in my view, wisely so. Chief Justice William
Rehnquist thus buttressed his conclusion that Article I, § 3,
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clause 6 constituted a textually demonstrable commitment of jurisdiction to the Senate by reasoning that there were no judicially
manageable standards for determining whether the Senate had
properly tried Chief Judge Nixon.138 In addition, the Court cited
prudential factors that would counsel urgently against judicial review of an impeachment and conviction of the president, should
one ever occur:
We agree with the Court of Appeals that opening the door of
judicial review to the procedures used by the Senate in trying
impeachments would “expose the political life of the country
to months, or perhaps years, of chaos.” This lack of finality
would manifest itself most dramatically if the President were
impeached. The legitimacy of any successor, and hence his
effectiveness, would be impaired severely, not merely while
the judicial process was running its course, but during any
retrial that a differently constituted Senate might conduct if
its first judgment of conviction were invalidated.139
The Court’s opinion in Rucho proceeded along similar lines.
Chief Justice Roberts blended functionalist arguments about the
absence of judicially manageable standards with reasoning that
emphasized the hazards of judicial intervention in a redistricting
“process that often produces ill will and distrust.”140 The latter
strand in the Court’s analysis had quasi-prudential aspects,
though it was framed in generalized terms, not presented as the
kind of ad hoc discretionary judgment that Bickel thought incapable of being “domesticated” within ordinary legal reasoning.141
2. Jurisprudential foundations.
If there is any valid objection to combination of the functional
and prudential with the classical theory of the political question
doctrine, it would need to hold that judges should not rely on considerations that they sometimes, perhaps frequently, have relied
on in the past. The most powerful challenge of this kind emanates
from the classical theory’s two defining elements: its insistence
that courts must adhere to legal norms that define obligations of
the judicial role and that they must eschew exercises of judicial
138

See id at 228–29.
See id at 236 (citation omitted).
140 Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2498, quoting Vieth, 541 US at 307 (Kennedy concurring in the
judgment).
141 Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 125 (cited in note 130).
139
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discretion that lack legal authorization. Each of these tenets
might appear in tension with functional theories, prudential approaches, or both.
The best response begins with acceptance of the premise that
judges and justices have a role-based obligation to obey the law
and thus to accede to legal constraints on their authority, even
when identifying political questions. But, having accepted that
premise, I would insist that the law, properly understood, does
not preclude reliance on functional and prudential considerations
in the way that Professor Wechsler and other traditional proponents of the classical model assumed.
We can best understand the political question doctrine by situating the Constitution and the role of the Article III judiciary
within a practice-based theory of law. According to practice-based
theories, the foundations of law lie in acceptance. For example,
the Constitution is law, not because the Framers commanded that
it should be, but because relevant constituencies living in the present accept it as such.142 To refer to the practices of acceptance
that constitute a legal system, Professor Hart introduced the term
“rule of recognition.”143 As others have emphasized, the term
“rule” may seem too quasi-algorithmic to capture the complex
practices of judges and other officials in identifying and applying
the law.144 But the underlying idea, which conveys a deep insight,
holds that for a legal system to exist, judges and other officials
must share criteria of legal validity. According to Hart, the rule
of recognition in all functioning legal systems exists as a matter
of social fact and is fixed by “the law-identifying and law-applying
operations of the courts.”145
As applied to the United States, the Hartian framework explains how the Constitution came to be law in the 1780s, despite

142

See Fallon, Law and Legitimacy at 87–92 (cited in note 99).
See Hart, Concept of Law at 94–95, 100–10, 116, 256 (cited in note 18).
144 See Frederick Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions of a Constitution, in Sanford Levinson, ed, Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional
Amendment 145, 150 (Princeton 1995) (emphasis in original):
143

There is no reason to suppose that the ultimate source of law need be anything
that looks at all like a rule, whether simple or complex, or even a collection of
rules, and it may be less distracting to think of the ultimate source of recognition
. . . as a practice.
145 Hart, Concept of Law at 256 (cited in note 18). See also id at 116 (asserting that
the “rules of recognition specifying the criteria of legal validity and [the legal system’s]
rules of change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as common public standards
of official behaviour by its officials”).
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being discontinuous with prior law. The Hartian framework also
elucidates why a variety of extraconstitutional rules of interpretation are also law.146 For example, the justices seem to adhere to
a rule or standard under which judicial precedents sometimes
control subsequent constitutional interpretation, especially if
they have generated weighty reliance interests, even if they deviate from the Constitution’s original meaning.147 Plainly, however,
any effort to conceptualize American constitutional practice in
Hartian terms must postulate that the rule of recognition that
prevails in the Supreme Court is underdeterminate in important
respects. No other plausible explanation can account for recurrent
divisions among the justices, some of which reflect moral or policy
disagreements. Taking note of this phenomenon, Professor Jules
Coleman has maintained that in reasonably disputable cases, the
judicial practices that fix the rule of recognition function less as a
determinant of uniquely correct decisions than as a conventional
“framework for bargaining.”148
The vagueness or underdeterminacy of the rule of recognition
provides crucial background for understanding the status of the
political question doctrine. Such a doctrine exists. It is defined
and limited by norms of legal obligation and judicial role that constrain and sometimes mandate the exercise of judicial power. But
the pertinent norms, as rooted in judicial practice and judges’ selfunderstanding of their role-based obligations, are vague in some
respects, and they do not categorically rule out judicial reliance
on functional and prudential considerations in weighing invocation of the political question doctrine.
In relying on judicial practice to vindicate judicial weighing
of functional and prudential considerations in identifying political questions, I acknowledge that Hart did not equate the law
with whatever a court—including our Supreme Court—might do
or assert in particular cases. To the contrary, he maintained that
courts, including highest courts, could violate the rule of recognition.149 Nevertheless, in maintaining that judges and justices violate the law by taking functional and prudential considerations
into account in political question and other cases, proponents of
146 See Richard H. Fallon Jr, Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the Lens of
Hartian Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 NC L Rev 1107, 1122–32 (2008).
147 See id.
148 See Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory 100 (Oxford 2001).
149 See Hart, Concept of Law at 145 (cited in note 18) (insisting that rules supply
“standards of correct judicial decision” that courts “are not free to disregard”).
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the classical theory would need to insist that the judges and justices who do so have misunderstood the implications of some fundamental legal rule that is either validated by practice or directly
traceable to a rule that is. So far, proponents of the classical theory have failed to meet that burden. Their position, moreover, is
rendered increasingly implausible by widespread acceptance of
functional and prudential judicial reasoning not only in political
question analysis, but also in reasoning on the merits of disputed
cases. I discuss the overlap between judicial reasoning in political
question and merits analysis in Part IV.A.
Professor Bickel had a subtly different reason for affirming
that the prudential theory of the political question doctrine could
not be reconciled with the classical model. He insisted that the
political question doctrine was different “in kind not in degree”
from other legal doctrines and that it “cannot exist within the four
corners of Marbury v. Madison.”150 As reflection on that formulation suggests, Bickel’s claims about the nature of the political
question doctrine were at best enigmatic. I am not sure what it
would mean for the political question doctrine or any other doctrine to “exist within the four corners of Marbury.” More important, Bickel’s stance was paradoxical. Although he implied
that the political question doctrine was somehow extralegal, his
argument was at bottom a legal argument about the criteria for
the appropriate application of a legal doctrine. He did not deny
that the political question doctrine exists as a matter of law. Nor
did he deny that judges could misapply it as a matter of law—for
example, by denominating questions as political whenever judges
disliked the parties for whom they would be obliged to rule if they
decided a case on the merits.
Modern justices who have echoed Bickel in emphasizing the
prudential aspect of the political question doctrine have therefore
rightly retained Bickel’s core insight that prudential considerations sometimes properly matter while abandoning his paradoxical insistence that the political question doctrine is extralegal.
Where courts have prudential reasons to invoke the political
question doctrine, they can and should cite those reasons as
grounds for their decision.
Judicial reliance on functional reasons for invoking the political question doctrine should be tested, and frequently accepted,
on the same terms. Within the law-defined limits of the judicial

150

Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch at 125–26 (cited in note 130).
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role, judges are often (though not always) justified in basing their
decisions on functional considerations, including in political question cases.
In short, the political question doctrine can and does combine
elements modeled by the classical, functional, and prudential
theories. The one strong condition for successful reconciliation of
the theories is that functional and prudential reasoning are permissible only insofar as authorized by law. Although strong in one
sense, that condition is of course debatable in its application to
some cases. As I have emphasized, any practice-based jurisprudential theory must acknowledge that the rule of recognition is
vague or underdeterminate in some important respects. That
said, it is past time to recognize that the classical, functional, and
prudential theories all play legally permissible roles in the shaping and application of the political question doctrine.
IV. EXPLAINING THE NARROWNESS OF THE POLITICAL QUESTION
DOCTRINE, BUT ALSO ITS PERSISTENCE
This Part explores two puzzles about the political question
doctrine that form mirror images of one another. The first involves the infrequency with which the Supreme Court invokes the
political question doctrine. Rucho furnishes an important recent
data point, which must be accounted for, but it is an anomaly.
Given the broad range of considerations that can support the
identification of political questions, one might expect the doctrine
to have a capacious reach. Yet Rucho is only the third majority
opinion since the 1930s to find that a case poses a nonreviewable
political question. Why?
The first two Sections of this Part answer that question by
offering paired explanations, both of which emerge from the ultra
vires conundrum. First, the reasons that would support the denomination of an issue as a political question can most often be
recast as reasons to deny relief on the merits, and the substantive
rejection of a plaintiff’s claim will typically have nearly the same
practical effects as a dismissal on political question grounds. Second, the Supreme Court most frequently prefers not to signal its
jurisdictionally based incapacity to function as the ultimate constitutional expositor in all cases. Among other reasons for the
Court not to advertise limits on its jurisdiction to resolve constitutional issues in otherwise justiciable cases, such advertisements would invite attention to the ultra vires conundrum that
would materialize if another institution were to insist that the
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Court, in a particular case, had acted ultra vires. Once the possibility of ultra vires judicial action is highlighted, a question might
follow that the Court understandably would prefer to see unasked: If the Supreme Court claims to be the ultimate authority
on constitutionally intra and ultra vires action, including its own,
who will guard the guardians?
The limited range of the political question doctrine frames
the puzzle that the third Section of this Part addresses: Why does
the modern Supreme Court retain the political question doctrine
at all? On this point, the evidence from Nixon and Rucho speaks
unequivocally. Political question rulings, I argue, send a stronger
signal than on-the-merits dismissals of judicial commitment to
avoid oversight of another branch of government in future cases.
They also further distance the Court from approving decisions by
the political branches that the justices decline to countermand.
While the Court normally prefers not to disavow all oversight, the
political question doctrine permits it to communicate singularly
unmistakable messages that responsibility for some ultimate decisions lies elsewhere.
A. The Overlap of Political Question Reasoning and Merits
Reasoning
Almost without exception, the considerations that would support a determination that a case poses a political question are
equally at home in judicial reasoning about appropriate outcomes
on the merits.151 To frame the point in light of the ultra vires conundrum, the distinction between on-the-merits review and judicial oversight only to redress ultra vires action blurs at the edges,
where highly deferential substantive review may have little more
practical bite than judicial inquiry into whether another institution has acted ultra vires.152 Under these circumstances, it should
151 See Zivotofsky, 566 US at 198, 201 (noting that the respondent’s merits arguments
“reprise[d]” her arguments that the case presented a political question and concluding that
“[r]ecitation of these arguments—which sound in familiar principles of constitutional interpretation—is enough to establish that this case does not ‘turn on standards that defy
judicial application’”); Tushnet, 80 NC L Rev at 1211 (cited in note 58) (contending that
“in a world where the Court is comfortable with interpreting the Constitution and uncomfortable with allowing anyone else to do so, once it is conceded that a provision means
something, the ‘textually demonstrable commitment’ element simply falls away.”); Henkin, 85 Yale L J at 605 (cited in note 1) (arguing that the Baker factors “seem rather to be
elements of the ordinary respect which the courts show to the substantive decisions of the
political branches”).
152 The tendency of the distinction to blur at the edges is illustrated in the history of
habeas corpus jurisdiction, where “decisional law, especially in recent times, has stretched
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occasion no surprise that the kinds of reasons that would lead to
deferential review are normally indistinguishable from those that
could be adduced to identify a nonjusticiable political question.
Nor should it be a shock that the Supreme Court would prefer to
define the limits of its capacity to review and revise other institutions’ constitutional determinations in nonjurisdictional terms.
The conclusion that the Supreme Court reasons identically in
identifying political questions and issuing merits rulings constitutes a defining tenet of the classical theory of the political question doctrine. As I emphasized, however, the classical theory insists that considerations involving the judicial role impose sharp
limits on the factors that courts can take into account when deciding constitutional cases on the merits.153 By contrast, the modern Court takes it for granted that textual and historical indicia
of constitutional meaning sometimes require supplementation by
functional, prudential, and other instrumental factors to yield
sound and determinate conclusions.154 As the range of considerations that courts can evaluate broadens, the classical theory loses
its bite. Functional and prudential analysis that the classical theory sought to minimize or exclude now feature as prominently in
merits reasoning as in identification of political questions.
Nixon exemplifies the blurring of boundaries. As Justice
White emphasized in concurrence, Articles I and II abound with
delegations of authority to Congress and the president.155 In
nearly all cases challenging the exercise of congressional and
presidential authority, courts therefore must engage in line drawing, if not to mark the boundaries of another branch’s judicially
unreviewable authority, then to determine the substantive limits
of constitutionally permissible but judicially reviewable action.156
In other words, as the ultra vires problem highlights, courts must
almost always decide whether Congress or the president overstepped constitutional bounds. The disputed issue in political
question cases typically involves the proper characterization of

the notion of jurisdiction, thereby making it difficult at times to distinguish jurisdiction
from the legal merits.” Fallon, et al, Hart and Wechsler at 1238 (cited in note 72).
153 See Part III.A.
154 See, for example, David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U Chi
L Rev 190, 208 (1988) (“Under any plausible approach to constitutional interpretation, the
courts must be authorized—indeed, required—to consider their own, and the other
branches’, limitations and propensities when they construct doctrine to govern future
cases.”); Fallon, 119 Harv L Rev at 1285–97 (cited in note 80).
155 See Nixon, 506 US at 240–42 (White concurring in the judgment).
156 See Part I.

1522

The University of Chicago Law Review

[87:1481

the bounds that the courts first must identify and then police: Are
they the bounds of another branch’s judicially unreviewable authority, or are they the criteria by which courts identify constitutional error in a domain in which another branch’s decisions are
judicially reviewable?
Rucho, in which the Court declined to find that the Constitution vested another branch with ultimate authority to interpret a
controverted provision, is admittedly a partial anomaly. It contemplates no judicial review of legislative discretion in drawing
district lines along a single, identified dimension, involving no
constitutional offense other than partisan advantage seeking,
even on the assumption that the legislature goes too far. Yet even
Rucho highlights the inescapable judicial responsibility for constitutional line drawing along other dimensions, even when challengers object to a gerrymander enacted to aid one political party
and harm another. In particular, the majority opinion expressly
recognized that the prerogative of legislatures to engage in partisan gerrymandering is bounded by a judicially enforceable prohibition against racial vote dilution and a demand for adherence to
the one-person, one-vote requirement.157
Moreover, whether the Supreme Court characterizes the
rules that it enforces as bounding a judicially nonreviewable jurisdiction or as substantive restrictions on judicially reviewable
decision-making, the Court must devise the tests that it applies.158
And when the Court does so, functional and prudential considerations that once were thought to be the hallmarks of political question reasoning frequently exert a large influence.
Commerce Clause doctrine furnishes an example. As much as
the Impeachment Trial Clause, the Commerce Clause is a textual
assignment of authority to another branch.159 One could, accordingly, imagine an argument that questions arising from Congress’s exercise of powers under the Commerce Clause are judicially unreviewable political questions. Indeed, historical
experience might have pointed the Supreme Court toward that
approach. In the period leading up to the Court’s famous “switch

157

See Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2495–96.
See Fallon, Law and Legitimacy at 26–44 (cited in note 99).
159 See US Const Art I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”).
158
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in time [that] save[d] nine” in 1937,160 the Court had tried to formulate tests that significantly circumscribed Congress’s regulatory powers. But the effort proved unsuccessful by a variety of
standards. When the Court reconsidered its standards for gauging congressional power under the Commerce Clause in the late
1930s and early 1940s, it gave Congress so much latitude that
Justice Robert Jackson, in private correspondence, expressed
doubt that the Court could ever again invalidate a regulatory
statute.161
Yet the Court, in rendering its crucial rulings in the 1930s
and 1940s, never described questions about Congress’s Commerce
Clause authority as political questions. Instead, from then
through the current day, it has consistently assumed that challenges to the exercise of Congress’s power are justiciable, even
though challenges to the regulation of private actors never succeeded in the Supreme Court in the nearly sixty years prior to the
Court’s 1995 decision in United States v Lopez.162
In the view of some commentators, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority163
effectively pushed one set of Commerce Clause questions into the
political question category.164 Garcia involved a challenge to congressional regulation of the wages and hours of local government
employees.165 Framed broadly, the question before the Court was

160 See Joseph Alsop and Turner Catledge, The 168 Days 135 (Doubleday, Doran
& Co 1938).
161 See Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court: The Structure of a Constitutional Revolution 221 (Oxford 1998) (“If we were to be brutally frank . . . I suspect what
we would say is that in any case where Congress thinks there is an effect on interstate
commerce, the Court will accept that judgment.”), quoting Letter from Robert Jackson to
Sherman Minton (Dec 21, 1942).
162 514 US 549 (1995). National League of Cities v Usery, 426 US 833 (1976), found
limitations on Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause to regulate state and local
governments in the performance of traditional governmental functions vital to their integrity, but the Court reversed that decision less than a decade later in Garcia v San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 US 528 (1985).
163 469 US 528 (1985).
164 See, for example, Barkow, 102 Colum L Rev at 308–10 (cited in note 22) (arguing
that “the Court’s treatment of the Commerce Clause tracks the rise and fall of the political
question doctrine” and citing the example of Garcia); Redish, 79 Nw U L Rev at 1057–59
(cited in note 1) (suggesting that the Court “employ[ed] some of [the political question
doctrine’s] precepts” in Garcia), citing Jesse Choper, Judicial Review and the National
Political Process (Chicago 1980); Mark Tushnet, Principles, Politics, and Constitutional
Law, 88 Mich L Rev 49, 58–59 (1989) (contending that Garcia “can be understood as adopting the view that objections to federal legislation on the ground that it intrudes on constitutionally protected domains of the states raise political questions”).
165 See Garcia, 469 US at 532–35.
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whether there are judicially enforceable limits on Congress’s
power under the Commerce Clause to regulate state and local
governments.166 In response, the Court held that when Congress
validly regulates private parties, it may regulate state and local
governments on the same basis, federalism-based concerns to the
contrary notwithstanding.167 In so ruling, Justice Harry
Blackmun’s opinion for the Court spoke in terms familiar in political question analysis. The Constitution, he affirmed, confers
authority to decide whether state and local governments should
be exempted from federal regulation to Congress, not the
courts.168 The Constitution’s assignment of this power should occasion neither surprise nor alarm, Justice Blackmun reasoned.
“It is no novelty,” he wrote, “to observe that the composition of the
Federal Government was designed in large part to protect the
States from overreaching by Congress,” including through the
equal representation of states in the Senate.169 With regard to judicial power, Justice Blackmun also professed “doubt that courts
ultimately can identify principled constitutional limitations on
the scope of Congress’ Commerce Clause powers over the States
merely by relying on a priori definitions of state sovereignty.”170
Nevertheless, the Court cast its ruling as one on the merits.
The Court has followed similar trains of reasoning in a myriad of cases in which constitutional allocations of power to Congress and the executive have profound implications for constitutional rights. Even when upholding broad official discretion,
traceable to textually demonstrable grants of authority, the Court
would rarely think it appropriate to characterize claims of individual rights as presenting political questions, no matter how deferential its standards of review might be. Nevertheless, the
Court’s reasoning often closely tracks the rhetoric of political
question analysis in combining reliance on a constitutional assignment of power to nonjudicial institutions with recognition of
166
167
168

Id at 537.
See id at 547–57.
See id at 552:

[T]he Framers chose to rely on a federal system in which special restraints on
federal power over the States inhered principally in the workings of the National
Government itself, rather than in discrete limitations on the objects of federal
authority. State sovereign interests, then, are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal power.
169
170

Garcia, 469 US at 550–51.
Id at 548.
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functional or prudential limits on the courts’ capacity to craft judicially manageable standards. Cases involving deference to the
military and to prison officials exemplify the pattern.171 As the
Court explained in Chappell v Wallace,172 “courts are ill-equipped
to determine the impact upon [military] discipline that any particular intrusion upon military authority might have.”173 Similarly, functional considerations underlie the Court’s approach to
complaints about the exercise of official discretion in prison
cases.174
Prudential considerations—which are not always sharply
distinguishable from reasons involving the courts’ lack of functional capacity to make good decisions in categories of cases with
potentially momentous consequences—also exert widespread influences on judicial decision-making in cases outside the political
question doctrine. It is hornbook law that courts of equity must
balance public and private interests before issuing injunctions.175
Accordingly, as Professor Louis Henkin persuasively argued, a
number of the Supreme Court’s political question holdings could
be recast as decisions about the inappropriateness of requested

171 For critical analysis of relevant doctrine, generally arguing that the Court’s decisions are undertheorized, see Eric Berger, Deference Determinations and Stealth Constitutional Decision Making, 98 Iowa L Rev 465, 485–92 (2013).
172 462 US 296 (1983).
173 Id at 305, quoting Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 NYU L Rev
181, 187 (1962) (quotation marks omitted).
174 See Shaw v Murphy, 532 US 223, 229–30 (2001) (rejecting a claim that inmates
have a First Amendment right to give legal advice to other inmates and noting that “courts
are particularly ‘ill equipped’ to deal with [the] problems” of prisons), quoting Procunier v
Martinez, 416 US 396, 404–05 (1974); O’Lone v Estate of Shabazz, 482 US 342, 349–50,
353 (1987) (noting the courts’ lack of institutional competence and applying Turner v
Safley, 482 US 78 (1987), to reject a free exercise challenge to prison regulations); Turner,
482 US at 84–85, 89 (establishing a relaxed standard of review in light of courts’ relative
lack of expertise in prison administration and separation-of-powers concerns). See also
Sharon Dolovich, Forms of Deference in Prison Law, 24 Fed Sent Rptr 245, 246 (2012)
(observing that “it is a rare case decided under Turner in which the plaintiff ultimately
prevails”).
175 Under the traditional balance-of-equities test, a federal court will not issue a permanent injunction unless the plaintiff can demonstrate:

(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law,
such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury;
(3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not
be disserved by a permanent injunction.
eBay Inc v MercExchange, LLC, 547 US 388, 391 (2006).
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equitable relief in light of the balance of public and private interests.176 Among his examples he listed Gilligan v Morgan, in which
the plaintiffs requested an injunction that would have entailed
ongoing judicial oversight of the organization, training, and deployment of the Ohio National Guard.177 However one judges the
result in Gilligan, it is indisputable that courts weigh prudential
considerations in determining whether and how to frame equitable decrees.
As recently as in Baker v Carr, the Supreme Court credited
the idea that questions were political if they required policy-based
discretionary judgments.178 Today, discretionary, policy-based
reasoning has become commonplace in constitutional cases decided by the Supreme Court.
B. The Typical Dispreference for Invoking the Political
Question Doctrine
With “ordinary” judicial reasoning involving considerations
that once might have seemed more political than judicial, Supreme Court decisions to invoke the political question doctrine
mostly reflect legally unforced choices. Moreover, as the rarity of
political question holdings illustrates, the Court almost invariably prefers to cast its decisions as resolving disputes on the merits. To explain the Court’s characteristic preference for framing
its decisions in merits rather than political question terms, I
would offer three conjectures, all related to the signal that a decision to invoke the political question doctrine sends.
First, the Supreme Court hesitates to mark issues as outside
its jurisdiction because of a belief among the justices that the
Court’s availability to resolve constitutional disputes is crucial to
the successful operation of the American constitutional order.179
Quite simply, the justices do not trust other branches of government to behave responsibly. Professor Pamela Karlan has written
of the modern Court’s “disdain” for Congress.180 Whether or not
176

Henkin, 85 Yale L J at 617–22 (cited in note 1).
See id at 619–22.
178 Baker, 369 US at 217 (suggesting that some cases may be nonjusticiable because
of “the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for nonjudicial discretion”).
179 See, for example, Barkow, 102 Colum L Rev at 317 (cited in note 22) (suggesting
that “[t]he political question doctrine cannot coexist with the current Court’s view of the
judiciary’s place in the constitutional structure”).
180 Pamela S. Karlan, The Supreme Court, 2011 Term—Foreword: Democracy and
Disdain, 126 Harv L Rev 1, 41–55 (2012).
177
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that term is apt, insofar as the Founding generation looked to
Congress to check constitutional overreach by the executive
branch, the rise of political parties has upset their plan. Congress
rarely asserts its prerogatives to thwart action in excess of jurisdiction by a president of the same party.181 Congress’s unreliability as a guardian of constitutional norms may encourage the
Court to regard judicial review as indispensable.
Even apart from negative attitudes toward other branches,
the Court has a lofty assessment of its own competence and of the
trust the American people have in it.182 In Cooper v Aaron,183 the
Court declared it to be a “basic principle” of our constitutional order “that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the
law of the Constitution.”184 The Court has also associated judicial
finality in constitutional adjudication with the requirements of
the rule of law, including in United States v Nixon,185 which held
that a court could compel the president to surrender tapes of Oval
Office conversations,186 and Planned Parenthood v Casey,187 which
involved abortion rights.188
In the minds of many, the Supreme Court’s exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction to resolve the dispute in Bush v Gore189 epitomized the normally reigning attitude among the justices.190 Although divided about much else, the justices apparently agreed
that the case was meet for judicial decision, despite its obviously
political subject matter and despite the availability of other institutions—including Congress, in discharge of its responsibility to
count the votes submitted by members of the electoral college in
presidential elections—to resolve disputed issues.191
181 See Daryl J. Levinson and Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers,
119 Harv L Rev 2312, 2324–25 (2006).
182 See Barkow, 102 Colum L Rev at 301–02 (cited in note 22) (“In the past few decades, [ ] the Supreme Court has become increasingly blind to its limitations as an institution—and, concomitantly, to the strengths of the political branches—and . . . acknowledges few limits on its power to say what the law is.”).
183 358 US 1 (1958).
184 Id at 18.
185 418 US 683 (1974).
186 See id at 703–14.
187 505 US 833 (1992).
188 See id at 868 (emphasizing the importance of steadfast and principled judicial decision-making to a nation of people who respect and “aspire to live according to the rule of law”).
189 531 US 98 (2000).
190 See Barkow, 102 Colum L Rev at 273–95 (cited in note 22); Tushnet, 80 NC L Rev
at 1228–29 (cited in note 58).
191 See, for example, Jesse H. Choper, Why the Supreme Court Should Not Have Decided the Presidential Election of 2000, 18 Const Commen 335, 336 (2001) (arguing that
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Also indicative of the Court’s views is its refusal to tolerate
any significant space for congressional interpretation of the Constitution in City of Boerne v Flores.192 Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment authorizes Congress “to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”193 On a plausible interpretation, Section 5 empowers Congress to prohibit conduct that the
Supreme Court has not found to violate the Constitution. During
the 1960s, the Court frequently upheld Congress’s authority to do
so under the enforcement clauses of the Thirteenth and Fifteenth
as well as the Fourteenth Amendments.194 But City of Boerne
drew an emphatic distinction between Congress’s power to enforce and its power to interpret the Civil War Amendments. The
Court characterized the latter as one that, since Marbury v Madison,195 has resided exclusively in the judicial branch196—subject,
presumably, to the narrow exception of the political question doctrine. Believing that judicial exclusivity and finality in defining
constitutional rights are part of the warp and woof of American
constitutionalism, the Court just as clearly believes that judicial
supremacy in constitutional interpretation serves vital interests.
Given the Supreme Court’s exalted appraisal of its role under
the Constitution, the justices understandably dislike denominating constitutional questions as political questions. By contrast,
merits rulings, even when deferential, affirm that judicial jurisdiction and oversight extend to uncharted limits.
A second reason for the justices to dislike the designation of
questions as political emerges from the central role that judicially
manageable standards play in political question cases. Once the
judicial role in devising judicially manageable standards is made
explicit, acknowledgment that no judicially manageable standards exist for the resolution of a dispute constitutes a confession

although “the issues addressed by the Justices in Bush v. Gore plainly presented two federal questions, . . . the central question in the case should have been resolved through the
political rather than the judicial process”).
192 521 US 507 (1997).
193 US Const Amend XIV, § 5.
194 See generally Christopher W. Schmidt, Section 5’s Forgotten Years: Congressional
Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Before Katzenbach v. Morgan, 113 Nw U L
Rev 47 (2018); Jones v Alfred H. Mayer Co, 392 US 409 (1968); South Carolina v Katzenbach, 383 US 301 (1966); Katzenbach v Morgan, 384 US 641 (1966).
195 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
196 See City of Boerne, 521 US at 536.
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of judicial failure: although it is a judicial function to devise judicially manageable standards, the Court came up short. For obvious reasons, the Court dislikes confessing failure.
To be sure, a failure by the Court to develop judicially manageable standards is not necessarily blameworthy. As I noted in
discussing Rucho, the justices can point to role constraints as affording them a defense.197 Nevertheless, as the recent course of
the Supreme Court’s decisions under the Commerce Clause has
illustrated, new cases with previously unforeseen facts can invite
case-by-case articulations of limits on the powers of another
branch that a Herculean judiciary could have anticipated earlier.
By dismissing a case on substantive rather than political question
grounds, the Court holds open the possibility of successful development of judicially manageable limits on other branches’ powers
in subsequent cases.
Third, the Supreme Court prefers not to acknowledge the institutional vulnerability that a labeling of some exercises of judicial power as ultra vires signals. Although the Court rarely voices
anxiety about its status as the ultimate arbiter of constitutional
controversies, recognition that some judicial actions would be ultra vires invites questions that the Court would likely prefer to
avoid.198 For now, suffice it to say that the Court’s institutional
vulnerability is likely to be felt most acutely when a claim of judicial jurisdiction to resolve an issue confronts a competing claim
of jurisdiction by another branch, most paradigmatically the
executive.
An admittedly contested historical example may illustrate
the kind of vulnerability that a charge of ultra vires judicial action
in a collision with the executive branch might expose. Ex parte
Merryman arose in Maryland in the aftermath of the Confederate
firing on Fort Sumter and before the scheduled reconvening of
Congress to address the secession crisis.199 With Congress out of
session, President Abraham Lincoln claimed authority to suspend
access to the writ of habeas corpus, despite the location of the
Suspension Clause in Article I, among the powers of Congress.200
197 See note 91 and accompanying text. See also Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint: How the Supreme Court Has Read the American Constitution 17–18 (Oxford
2019) (arguing that the Supreme Court recognizes sometimes complementary and sometimes competing obligations of “fidelity to meaning” and “fidelity to role”).
198 I talk more about the possible ramifications of ultra vires judicial action in Part V.
199 For an account of the surrounding events and an analysis of the Merryman decision, see Daniel A. Farber, Lincoln’s Constitution 17, 157–63, 188–95 (Chicago 2003).
200 See id at 158.

1530

The University of Chicago Law Review

[87:1481

Acting pursuant to ostensible authority delegated by the president,201 military officials suspended the writ in Maryland,202
where they detained John Merryman. A petition for the writ was
nevertheless presented on Merryman’s behalf to Chief Justice
Roger Taney, who responded with an in-chambers opinion.203 In
it, the chief justice recounted that he had issued the writ to compel Merryman to be brought before him and that military officials
had failed to comply.204 Chief Justice Taney further rejected the
claim that either the president or his delegates could suspend access to the writ of habeas corpus without congressional authorization.205 In hopes of achieving compliance with his ruling, Chief
Justice Taney announced his intention to “order all the proceedings in this case, with [his] opinion, to be . . . transmit[ted], under
seal, to the president of the United States . . . for that high officer,
in fulfilment of his constitutional obligation . . . to determine what
measures he will take to cause the civil process of the United
States to be respected and enforced.”206 Nevertheless, President
Lincoln took no action to secure the prisoner’s release.207
In a message to Congress several months later, President
Lincoln defended the administration’s response to the chief justice’s ruling by explaining his legal conclusion that the Constitution permitted his emergency suspension of access to habeas corpus.208 Attorney General Edward Bates subsequently defended
the refusal of federal officials to comply with Chief Justice Taney’s
order directing Merryman’s release, essentially on the ground

201 President Lincoln did not initially issue any public proclamation suspending the
writ of habeas corpus, but instead authorized its suspension by military commanders in a
letter to General Winfield Scott. Letter from President Abraham Lincoln to General Winfield Scott (Apr 27, 1861), in Don E. Fehrenbacher, ed, Abraham Lincoln: Speeches and
Writings 1859–1865: Speeches, Letters, and Miscellaneous Writings, Presidential Messages
and Proclamations 237 (Library of America 1989).
202 There may be a difference between suspending “The Privilege of the Writ,” US
Const Art I, § 9 (emphasis added), and suspending the writ itself. See Ex parte Milligan,
71 US (4 Wall) 2, 130–31 (1866) (“The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus does not suspend the writ itself.”). President Lincoln used the latter phrase, which
now predominates. See Baude, 96 Georgetown L J at 1853 n 255 (cited in note 19).
203 See Farber, Lincoln’s Constitution at 17 (cited in note 199).
204 See Merryman, 17 F Cases at 147–48.
205 See id at 148–49.
206 Id at 153.
207 Merryman was released eventually and charged with, though never tried for, a
crime. See Amanda L. Tyler, Habeas Corpus in Wartime: From the Tower of London
to Guantanamo Bay ch 7 (2017).
208 Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in Abraham Lincoln: Speeches and Writings 1859–1865 246, 252–53 (cited in note 201).
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that suspension of the writ and detention of prisoners under exigent wartime circumstances lay within the judicially unreviewable discretion of the president.209 By implication, he thus argued
that the chief justice’s order was ultra vires and, therefore, without legal authority.
President Lincoln’s actions in purporting to suspend the writ
of habeas corpus and in refusing to accede to the chief justice’s
decision in Merryman have provoked voluminous commentary.210
Constitutional scholars agree with near unanimity that executive
officials, including the president, must ordinarily obey judicial
rulings in particular cases, even if they continue to dispute the
legal reasoning on which those rulings rested, either in the court
of public opinion or in other cases.211 But some have defended an
exception to that rule, involving judicial decisions that are ultra
vires: because ultra vires rulings exceed the jurisdiction of courts
to issue, presidents and possibly other high federal officials can
permissibly refuse to comply with them.212
Applying the concept of ultra vires action to Merryman brings
several complexities to the fore. On the surface, the question
whether the president could validly suspend the writ of habeas
corpus would appear to fall squarely within the jurisdiction of a
court to resolve. Courts always have jurisdiction to determine

209 See Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 10 Op Atty Gen 74,
79–81 (1861) (Edward Bates).
210 See, for example, Farber, Lincoln’s Constitution 159–62 (cited in note 199);
Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Great Suspender’s Unconstitutional Suspension of the
Great Writ, 3 Albany Govt L Rev 575, 614 (2010) (arguing that President Lincoln’s purported suspension of the writ was unconstitutional because the Suspension Clause exclusively vests the suspension power in Congress); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 Georgetown L J 217, 278–88
(1994) (defending President Lincoln’s actions in connection with Merryman as a proper
exercise of the President’s “coordinate” power to interpret the Constitution). See also generally Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Power to Suspend Habeas Corpus: An Answer from the Arguments Surrounding Ex Parte Merryman, 34 U Balt L Rev 11 (2004) (reviewing the contemporaneous legal arguments surrounding President Lincoln’s actions in the wake of
Merryman).
211 See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations
for Judgments, 15 Cardozo L Rev 43, 46 (1993) (“[T]here is widespread agreement that
the executive has a legal duty to enforce valid final judgments rendered by courts, regardless of whether the executive agrees with the legal analysis that forms the basis for the
judgment.”). The sole prominent exception may be Paulsen, 83 Georgetown L J (cited in
note 210). See Gary Lawson and Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 Iowa L Rev 1267, 1313–14 (1996) (noting Professor Michael
Stokes Paulsen’s outlier status with regard to this point).
212 See Baude, 96 Georgetown L J at 1862 (cited in note 19) (arguing that the judicial
power to bind the president applies only when a court is acting within its jurisdiction).
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their own jurisdiction, including by considering whether purported limits on their jurisdiction are constitutionally valid.213
To conclude that the chief justice had acted ultra vires, Bates
therefore had to maintain that the authority to adjudge a judicial
ruling ultra vires, in a case implicating what the president insisted were judicially unreviewable presidential powers, resided
in the executive.214 Bates did not claim that the president’s conclusion lay beyond all question. Congress, he noted, might have
responded to executive abuse of power (if it believed that such had
occurred) by adopting articles of impeachment.215 But apart from
articles of impeachment or an adverse reaction by voters, Bates
seemed to assume that the executive branch could and perhaps
must judge for itself whether a suspension of habeas corpus lay
within the president’s power and whether a judicial decision to
issue the writ was ultra vires.
Bates’s opinion bears directly on the nature and scope of the
political question doctrine. In stating the president’s case, he argued that “the whole subject-matter” of how to fight a civil war or
suppress a rebellion was “political and not judicial”216 and thus,
apparently, that whether the judicial branch had acted ultra vires
by intruding into that domain must also be a political question.
In “deny[ing] that [the president] is under any obligation to obey
. . . a writ” that interfered with his “political” function in suppressing a rebellion,217 the attorney general’s opinion cited Luther
v Borden,218 which framed the political question doctrine in jurisdictional terms and identified some questions as committed to
Congress and the president, not the courts, for authoritative
resolution.
213 See, for example, Boumediene v Bush, 553 US 723, 739 (2008) (“agree[ing]” that
an applicable statute “deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction to entertain the habeas
corpus actions now before us” but proceeding to address the question of the statute’s constitutional validity); Felker v Turpin, 518 US 651, 658 (1996) (commencing inquiry into
whether a statutory limitation on the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction “constitutes
an unconstitutional restriction”).
214 See Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 10 Op Atty Gen at
77 (cited in note 209).
215 See id at 91. When Congress subsequently discussed Merryman in the course of
debates about whether to authorize the president to suspend the writ, reactions divided
along political lines, with Lincoln’s opponents condemning and his supporters approving
his actions. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and Fragility) of Judicial Independence,
71 Vand L Rev 465, 493 (2018).
216 Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 10 Op Atty Gen at 86
(cited in note 209).
217 Id at 90.
218 See id at 90–91.
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For the moment, I want to defer all of the questions that Merryman and President Lincoln’s and Bates’s responses to it raise.
I come to some of them in Part V. For now, my point is narrow.
By highlighting jurisdictional limits on the judicial power to interpret the Constitution authoritatively and identifying some
constitutional questions as committed to other branches, political
question rulings invite a series of questions—linked as aspects of
the ultra vires conundrum—that the Supreme Court understandably might think discomfiting, including these: If a court were to
issue an ultra vires ruling, would it have legally binding effect?
And who gets to judge whether judicial rulings are ultra vires?
C. Reasons for Retaining the Political Question Doctrine:
Signaling Effects
With the Supreme Court rarely invoking the political question doctrine, the question next to be confronted is why the Court
retains it. Especially in light of the ultra vires problem, why does
the Court not cast all of its rulings denying plaintiffs’ claims to
relief as merits decisions, as resting on standing or related doctrines, or as involving requests for relief that the law of remedies
renders unavailable?219
The best explanation involves signaling. In at least two ways,
a ruling that a question is nonjusticiable may achieve different
expressive effects from a decision that rejects a constitutional
challenge on the merits.
First, as compared with a decision that a plaintiff’s claim fails
on the merits, a political question holding characteristically communicates a more emphatic message regarding the judicial commitment to a hands-off stance toward a category of disputes and
thus more decisively underlines the futility of further litigation.220
The justices in Nixon v United States showed acute cognizance of
this cuing, though they divided in their response. In the face of
Justice Souter’s insistence that surely the Senate would violate
the Constitution if it resolved an impeachment case by flipping a
coin, Chief Justice Rehnquist implied that the Court would not
involve itself in impeachment disputes even under circumstances
219 In response, Henkin argues that the Supreme Court’s failure simply to resolve
questions on merits, standing, or equitable grounds is confused and misleading. See Henkin, 85 Yale L J at 622 (cited in note 1).
220 See, for example, Gerhardt, 44 Duke L J at 245–46 (cited in note 62) (“[A] determination of nonjusticiability . . . signals once and for all that there is no judicial remedy
available for any official misconduct within a certain area.”).
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as extreme as those. Just as adamantly, Justices Souter and
White thought that the Court should make plain that it had only
ruled on the case before it, not tendered the Senate a blank
check.221
Signaling has played an even larger role in the Supreme
Court’s debates—culminating in Rucho—about whether challenges to partisan gerrymandering present political questions.
Most revealing on this score was the division in Vieth v Jubelirer
between Justice Scalia, who wrote the plurality opinion, and Justice Kennedy, who concurred in the result. Justice Scalia believed
the Court should hold decisively that federal courthouse doors
were closed to challenges to partisan gerrymanders.222 By contrast, Justice Kennedy’s careful insistence that no judicially manageable standards for resolving disputes about gerrymanders had
yet emerged sought to signal that challengers could continue to
press gerrymandering complaints and theories, even if their prospects for success were poor:
The plurality demonstrates the shortcomings of the [ ] standards that have been considered to date.
...
[But the fact that] no [adequate] standard has emerged in
this case should not be taken to prove that none will emerge
in the future. Where important rights are involved, the impossibility of full analytical satisfaction is reason to err on
the side of caution.223
Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in Rucho sided with
Justice Scalia. The majority determined categorically that challenges to partisan gerrymanders present political questions. Although Chief Justice Roberts noted that the political question doctrine would not apply to state courts adjudicating claims under
state constitutions,224 he sought to communicate as unequivocally
as possible that the Article III courts could entertain no future

221

See notes 119–22 and accompanying text.
Vieth, 541 US at 305 (Scalia) (plurality) (glossing Justice Kennedy’s concurrence
as “a reluctant fifth vote against justiciability at district and statewide levels—a vote that
may change in some future case but that holds, for the time being, that this matter is
nonjusticiable”).
223 Id at 308–11 (Kennedy concurring in the judgment).
224 See Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2507–08.
222
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complaints about partisan gerrymanders (that do not offend previously articulated, judicially enforceable limits such as the oneperson, one-vote norm).225
Although the justices are probably correct to believe that the
expressive effects of dismissals on political question grounds are
more potent than those of rulings on the merits in precluding future litigation, neither the Court nor we should exaggerate the
difference. On the one hand, a merits ruling can sometimes preclude future litigation very decisively. Consider the Supreme
Court’s determination that there is no constitutional right to have
electoral districts drawn with the aim of promoting racially proportional representation.226 That ruling leaves little room for argument in subsequent litigation. On the other hand, after a decision that one case presents a political question, litigants in a
future case may substantially repackage their claims under another constitutional provision. Justice Felix Frankfurter thought
that the vote dilution claim that the Court held justiciable in
Baker was for all practical purposes identical to the claim that the
Court had dismissed as nonjusticiable under the Guarantee
Clause in Colegrove v Green.227
Moreover, in light of the ultra vires problem that this Article
has emphasized, a ruling that a challenged action by a nonjudicial
institution came within that institution’s nonreviewable jurisdiction does not necessarily imply that another assertion of authority by the same actor under the same provision could not be ultra
vires. To repeat a now-tired example, if the Senate purported to
impose a punishment on an impeached official that went beyond
removal from office, the courts would presumably remain open to
that official’s argument that the Senate had acted ultra vires, notwithstanding the decision in Nixon.
Nonetheless, the difference between merits review and ultra
vires review can be significant, as the law has long recognized in

225

Id at 2506–08.
See City of Mobile v Bolden, 446 US 55, 75–76 (1980) (Stewart) (plurality) (“The
Equal Protection Clause . . . does not require proportional representation as an imperative
of political organization.”); id at 86 (Stevens concurring in the judgment) (“Neither Gomillion nor any other case decided by this Court establishes a constitutional right to proportional representation for racial minorities.”).
227 328 US 549 (1946). See Baker, 369 US at 297 (Frankfurter dissenting) (“The present
case involves all of the elements that have made the Guarantee Clause cases non-justiciable.
It is, in effect, a Guarantee Clause claim masquerading under a different label.”).
226
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affirming the narrowness of ultra vires inquiries.228 Nixon is again
illustrative. The Court’s pointed refusal to mark a decision by coin
flip as ultra vires shows how limited ultra vires review can be.
A second signaling effect of the Supreme Court’s denomination of a question as political rather than judicial is potentially
more robust. As Professor Black argued, the public may perceive
judicial decisions that reject constitutional challenges on the merits as conveying messages of approval or “legitimat[ion].”229 In
Rucho, the Court emphasized that its ruling carried no such message. “Our conclusion does not condone excessive partisan gerrymandering,” Chief Justice Roberts wrote.230 He added that
“[e]xcessive partisanship in districting leads to results that reasonably seem unjust” and that “such gerrymandering is ‘incompatible with democratic principles.’” 231
Regardless of whether the public accepts the chief justice’s
protestations, the Court’s invocation of the political question doctrine made it possible for him to utter them. Had the Court ruled
on the merits, it would have been much more complicated to explain how constitutional provisions that bar “too much”232 partisan advantage seeking tolerate the extreme gerrymandering in
Rucho.
***
Insofar as the distinctive effect and potential benefit of the
political question doctrine reside in its signaling effects, the Supreme Court needs to weigh the costs and benefits of wanted and
unwanted signals in determining whether to classify a particular
constitutional question as beyond judicial jurisdiction to resolve.

228 See, for example, Thomas W. Merrill, Step Zero After City of Arlington, 83 Fordham L Rev 753, 772 & n 126 (2014) (noting that courts routinely “manage to resolve[, for
instance,] . . . whether a federal question is presented without confounding this with the
resolution of the merits” and criticizing City of Arlington v Federal Communications Commission, 569 US 290 (2013), for denying such a distinction in review of agency action).
229 See Charles L. Black Jr, The People and the Court: Judicial Review in a Democracy 80, 86 (Macmillan 1960) (arguing that “judicial review serves an affirmative function vital to the government of limited powers—the function of keeping up a satisfactorily
high public feeling that the government has obeyed the law of its own Constitution”). For
an equally classic argument that the Court should sometimes invoke justiciability doctrines to avoid the necessity of either invalidating or legitimating governmental actions,
see Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 69 (cited in note 130).
230 Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2507.
231 Id at 2506, quoting Arizona State Legislature v Arizona Independent Redistricting
Commission, 135 S Ct 2652, 2658 (2015).
232 Rucho, 139 S Ct at 2489.
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In some cases, a political question ruling promises to communicate the wanted message that no one should expect the courts to
involve themselves in constitutional disputes of a particular kind.
Moreover, even if the Court does not displace a constitutional decision by another branch, neither does the Court affirm or legitimate that decision. At the same time, however, a determination
that a case presents a political question conveys a reminder—
which courts may dislike emitting—that some imaginable judicial
rulings would be ultra vires. In any particular case, the effects of
the latter message would likely prove trivial. Even so, it is easy
to see, once again, why the Supreme Court would not wish to signal the limits of its jurisdiction to interpret the Constitution authoritatively and its potential vulnerability to challenge for ultra
vires decisions very often.233
V. THE ULTIMATE POLITICAL QUESTION: IS A JUDICIAL RULING
ULTRA VIRES?
This Part confronts the challenges that serious allegations of
ultra vires action by the judicial branch in failing to apply the
political question doctrine would pose. It begins by addressing
two questions that the prospect of ultra vires action by the courts
make inescapable. First, are ultra vires judicial decisions nevertheless legally and morally binding? Second, if not, then who
should decide, and who as a sociological matter would have the
power to decide, whether judicial action is ultra vires?
With these questions, a new dimension of the concept of political questions assumes a crystalline importance. One might
maintain that the courts should decide, authoritatively in all
cases, whether their decisions are intra vires and thus binding on
officials of the political branches. But another possibility would
be that the Constitution, as properly interpreted, assigns the responsibility for determining whether judicial rulings are ultra
vires and thus whether they are legally binding to nonjudicial institutions or officials.
This Part begins by offering a brisk, negative answer to the
question whether ultra vires judicial rulings—defined as those in
which courts overstep the outer bounds of their jurisdiction in

233 See Tushnet, 80 NC L Rev at 1230–31 (cited in note 58) (arguing that the political
question doctrine has waned as our legal and political culture has grown more accepting
of judicial supremacy and as Supreme Court justices have experienced less self-doubt than
in earlier eras).
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purporting to resolve a constitutional question—are legally binding. It then argues that courts cannot authoritatively determine
the outer boundaries of their own jurisdiction in cases of manifest
overreach. Although differing in important respects from judicially identified political questions, questions concerning whether
courts have acted ultra vires and thus forfeited claims to obedience are political questions in a more ultimate sense, committed
for authoritative resolution to nonjudicial decision-makers, as
Attorney General Bates suggested in Merryman.234 In resolving
such questions, officials of the political branches, and ultimately
the American people, should afford strong deference to judicial
rulings, but they should not regard themselves as estopped from
assessing whether a judicial decision is intra vires.
A. The Nonbinding Character of Ultra Vires Judicial Rulings
Almost by definition, a purportedly authoritative decisionmaker acting in excess of legal authority has no legal entitlement
to obedience. The law recognizes as much in various contexts, including that of military justice. Service personnel are obliged to
obey orders by their superiors within the scope of their superiors’
authority, but not if a superior directs manifestly unlawful behavior such as war crimes.235 The difficulty lies in tracing the outer
bounds of legal authority once it is recognized that jurisdiction
encompasses the authority to decide erroneously, sometimes including about the scope of an institution’s actual jurisdiction.236 I
return to this point below.

234

See notes 209–18 and accompanying text.
See Manual for Courts-Martial, United States Rule 916(d) (2012) (“It is a defense
to any offense that the accused was acting pursuant to orders unless the accused knew the
orders to be unlawful or a person of ordinary sense and understanding would have known
the orders to be unlawful.”).
236 Some older Supreme Court decisions hold that officials subject to writs of mandamus issued in excess of jurisdiction need not comply with the orders. See, for example, Ex
parte Ayers, 123 US 443, 485–87 (1887); Ex parte Rowland, 104 US 604, 617–18 (1881). In
Ex parte Fisk, 113 US 713, 718 (1885), the Court differentiated between the obligation to
obey contempt orders made in error and the right to disobey orders made outside the jurisdiction of the court. More recently, United States v United Mine Workers of America,
330 US 258 (1947), affirmed the existence of an obligation to obey even constitutionally
erroneous judicial orders, but in a case
235

where, as here, the subject matter of the suit, as well as the parties, was properly
before the court; where the elements of federal jurisdiction were clearly shown;
and where the authority of the court of first instance to issue an order ancillary
to the main suit depended upon a statute, the scope and applicability of which
were subject to substantial doubt.
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Moral authority does not necessarily track legal authority.237
Under some circumstances, a person or institution without legal
authority could acquire morally legitimate authority from some
other source, such as the imperative demands of justice or public
safety under emergency conditions.238 But a court claiming moral
authority to resolve a question that is properly within the jurisdiction of another branch would need to carry an extraordinary
burden of justification. There would have to be moral grounds not
only for the court’s overstepping its own jurisdiction, but also for
usurping the jurisdiction of one or more other legally legitimate
institutions.239
B. Who Should Decide?
The second question, involving who gets to decide whether a
judicial decision is ultra vires, is more difficult. In a variety of
contexts, courts have jurisdiction to determine their own jurisdiction—for example, to ascertain whether a plaintiff has standing,
whether a complaint states a claim on which relief could be
granted, or whether a statute purporting to confer or limit judicial
jurisdiction is constitutionally valid.240 Moreover, as I have em-

Id at 294. Some commentators have read United Mine Workers as affirming an obligation
to obey contempt orders and as permitting collateral attacks on them in subsequent proceedings only in cases involving a frivolous or insubstantial basis for the assertion of
subject matter jurisdiction. See John R.B. Palmer, Collateral Bar and Contempt: Challenging a Court Order After Disobeying It, 88 Cornell L Rev 215, 233 (2002).
237 In distinguishing legal from moral legitimacy, see notes 99–103 and accompanying
text, I embrace a positivist theory of law, see Fallon, 86 NC L Rev at 1126 & n 69 (cited
in note 146), but one that invites distinctions between morally legitimate and morally illegitimate law.
238 See Joseph Raz, Legitimate Authority, in The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and
Morality 3, 9–10 (Oxford 1979).
239 As a possible example, a plausible interpretation of the events surrounding Merryman would be that President Lincoln acted with moral even if not with legal authority
when he purported to suspend access to the writ of habeas corpus and that executive officials similarly acted morally legitimately in defying the writ of habeas corpus that Chief
Justice Taney issued. See also Fallon, Law and Legitimacy at 37–38 (cited in note 99)
(advancing a similar argument about Bolling v Sharpe, 347 US 497 (1954), in which the
Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which was
ratified at a time when the Constitution tolerated slavery, barred race discrimination in
the District of Columbia schools).
240 See, for example, Bell v Hood, 327 US 678, 682 (1946) (noting that “the court must
assume jurisdiction to decide whether the allegations state a cause of action on which the
court can grant relief”); Boumediene v Bush, 553 US 723, 739 (2008) (recognizing jurisdiction to inquire into validity of a statutory restriction on jurisdiction).
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phasized is generally the case with jurisdiction, jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction can include a power to decide erroneously but
nevertheless authoritatively.241
In plumbing the scope of courts’ authority to determine their
own jurisdiction, analysis can begin with Professor Hart’s idea of
a rule of recognition. Despite his central focus on the courts, Hart
contemplated that the practices of nonjudicial officials might play
a part in determining a society’s rule or rules of recognition.242 In
seeking clarity on this point, we should recognize that different
rules of recognition might apply to different categories of officials.
For instance, Supreme Court precedent binds lower court judges
but not necessarily the justices. For lower court judges and other
officials, we thus might say as a first approximation: whatever
the Supreme Court says or has said is law, and has not overruled,
is law. But that prescription would not hold for the justices, for
whom adherence to stare decisis is not an absolute requirement.
Nor should we assume that the simple formula “Whatever the Supreme Court says is law” holds categorically even for all nonjudicial officers. For example, there could, in principle, be an exception for Supreme Court rulings that were ultra vires, such as a
hypothetical judicial decision directing the House to vote articles
of impeachment against the president and the Senate to vote for
conviction.
According to Hart, questions about the content of the rule of
recognition typically have factual answers.243 And if we look to
history, officials almost invariably accede to Supreme Court decisions, including rulings on the outer boundaries of judicial power
that the officials regard as misguided. From this practice, one
might infer that officials feel a legal obligation to accept judicial
decisions about the scope of judicial power. If so, a practice-based
analysis might point toward the conclusion that the rule of recognition that applies to nonjudicial officials dictates this result.
But we should not let our inferences run ahead of the evidence, as I sought to signal by imagining an order by the Supreme
Court directing the House to impeach and the Senate to convict
the president on charges of high crimes and misdemeanors. Such
an order would run in the teeth of the Constitution and, in the
view of any reasonable observer, would lie beyond the outer perimeter of the Court’s lawful authority to render. If we ask
241
242
243

See notes 27–28 and accompanying text.
See Hart, Concept of Law at 116 (cited in note 18).
See id.
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whether it would bind legally and morally conscientious members
of the House and Senate, I do not believe that historical practice
determines a clear answer. In a case exhibiting this degree of
egregiousness, the historical practice of official accession to other
judicial orders notwithstanding, I believe we could expect officials
to look at one another and ask, Must we accept a judicial determination in this kind of case, the precise likes of which we have
never seen before, in which the judicial overreach seems so clear
and so serious?
If this question arose in enough minds, it could not be answered as one of fact. The most relevant fact would be that the
officials whose felt obligations and resulting behavior fix the content of the rule of recognition were divided or uncertain in their
judgments. Nor, it is important to see, should the question in issue be interpreted as involving whether officials are obliged to
obey the law. Rather, in a case in which the rule of recognition
picks out no determinate answer, the issue becomes one of constitutional role morality, which could itself be framed as one about
how relevant officials could best promote the moral legitimacy of
the American constitutional order: Under what circumstances, if
any, should a conscientious official feel entitled or possibly obliged
to disregard a judicial pronouncement?
Two possible approaches stand out. According to the first, it
would better promote the rule of law and other relevant values
for conscientious officials and citizens to accept judicial rulings on
the outer boundaries of judicial jurisdiction as authoritative, even
if fair-minded observers would adjudge the judicial rulings ultra
vires. The foundation for this view traces to a conception of the
rule of law requiring that some institution should have the authority to furnish final, binding decisions of disputed legal questions.244 If one accepts that premise, the most plausible ultimate
arbiter within our system is the judicial branch.245 As the Supreme Court wrote in Marbury v Madison, “It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
244 See, for example, Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 Harv L Rev 1359, 1371–75 (1997).
245 See Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy: A
Reply, 17 Const Commen 455, 476 (2000):

One reason for believing that the Supreme Court rather than Congress or the
Executive is the best institution to wield the settlement authority, however, is
the Court’s relative insulation from political winds, a clear virtue unless one
holds the view that constitutional interpretation is and should be no more than
the expression of contemporary values and policies.
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is.”246 As Justice Jackson explicated in a later case, “We are not
final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because
we are final.”247 This position also resonates with the iconic argument of Thomas Hobbes that sovereign authority to say what the
law is must reside in a single body for the benefits of the rule of
law to be realized.248
An alternative conception of the rule of law, which draws inspiration and support from the republican political tradition, opposes ceding “control over the law to any one individual or
body.”249 In a series of thoughtful essays, Professor Gerald
Postema has recently championed the republican position over
the Hobbesian premise that the rule of law requires the vesting
of unchallengeable authority to say what the law is in a single
decision-maker.250 In a governmental regime that purports to be
one “of laws, not of men [and women],”251 the Hobbesian conception furnishes no answer to the worry, Who will guard the guardians? The best response, Postema maintains, requires that those
who rule in the name of the law should themselves be ruled by
law.252 According to him, “[r]eflexivity—law ruling those who rule
with law and in its name—is the rule of law’s sine qua non.”253
And the requisite reflexivity can exist, Postema argues, only if all
officials—judges and justices as much as others—are locked in
networks of mutual and reciprocal accountability for their fidelity
to the law.
Stated in that abstract form, Postema’s argument does not
directly establish the form that an ideal accountability network,

246

Marbury, 5 US (1 Cranch) at 177.
Brown v Allen, 344 US 443, 540 (Jackson concurring in the result).
248 See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 224 (Cambridge 1996) (Richard Tuck, ed) (originally published 1651) (rejecting the proposition that “he that hath the Sovereign Power,
is subject to the Civill Lawes”) (emphasis omitted).
249 Philip Pettit, On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy 5 (2012). Pettit associates republican thought with commitments to “the equal
freedom of citizens,” the premise that “if [a] republic is to secure the freedom of its citizens
then it must satisfy a range of constitutional constraints,” and the “idea [ ] that if the
citizens are to keep the republic to its proper business then they had better have the collective and individual virtue to track and contest public policies.” Id.
250 See generally Gerald J. Postema, Law’s Rule: Reflexivity, Mutual Accountability,
and the Rule of Law, in Xiaobo Zhai and Michael Quinn, eds, Bentham’s Theory of Law
and Public Opinion 7 (Cambridge 2014). See also Gerald J. Postema, Fidelity in Law’s
Commonwealth, in Lisa M. Austin and Dennis Klimchuk, eds, Private Law and the Rule
of Law 17, 18 (Oxford 2014).
251 Marbury, 5 US (1 Cranch) at 163.
252 See Postema, Law’s Rule at 22 (cited in note 250).
253 Id at 23 (emphasis omitted).
247
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in which judges not only hold others accountable to law but can
be held accountable themselves, ought to take. In a minimal conception, it might suffice for judges to be accountable only to each
other or to be subject to professional criticism in law reviews. A
more robust conception of accountability networks aimed at ensuring fidelity to law by judges as well as other officials has resounded through American history under the rubric of “departmentalism.”254 As formulated by Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison, among others, departmentalism holds that the three
branches or departments of the federal government are coequal,
with each having authority to decide for itself what the Constitution means or requires.255 Ordinarily, departmentalists typically
acknowledge, executive officials in particular should defer to judicial rulings in cases to which they are parties.256 But in important cases of perceived judicial overreach, the departmentalist
view leaves open the possibility that the president could and
sometimes should act on his or her own conscientious view of
what the Constitution requires.257
Merryman furnishes a possible example of departmentalism
in practice. For the executive branch, President Lincoln determined that he possessed constitutional authority to suspend access to the writ of habeas corpus. Acting with the authority of the
judicial branch, Chief Justice Taney disagreed and issued the
writ. The executive then invoked the departmentalist prerogative
not to accede. In response to the resulting showdown, Congress
could have added its voice to the mix: the House of Representatives could have sided with the chief justice by voting articles of
impeachment against the president or with the president by voting articles of impeachment against the chief justice. In the event,
it did neither. And with or without congressional action, the

254 See, for example, Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review 105–10, 135–36 (Oxford 2004).
255 See id at 106.
256 See, for example, Lawson and Moore, 81 Iowa L Rev at 1313–14 (cited in note 211)
(“With the notable exception of Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen, every modern departmentalist scholar has maintained that the President has an obligation to enforce specific
judgments rendered by federal courts, even when the President believes that the judgments rest on erroneous constitutional reasoning.”) (citations omitted).
257 See, for example, Baude, 96 Georgetown L J at 1812 (cited in note 19) (arguing
that “judgment supremacy has jurisdictional limits”); Paulsen, 83 Georgetown L J at 222
(cited in note 210) (defending an independent presidential power of constitutional interpretation as a “consequence of a broader theory” that “liberty is best preserved where governmental power is diffused”).
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American public could have claimed a role in the contest over executive and judicial power. By voting in subsequent elections, the
electorate could have registered its approval or disapproval of the
constitutional positions adopted by electorally accountable actors.258
To many contemporary Americans, the departmentalist approach looks clumsy, chaotic, and frightening.259 When it is taken
in undiluted form, I agree.260 Nonetheless, Postema persuades me
that an unalloyed embrace of judicial supremacy—in which Supreme Court pronouncements of what the law is or requires are
accepted as self-validating by all other officials—is equally untenable. As he puts it, according any official or institution a boundless authority to determine its own jurisdiction leaves no logical
space between a claim of lawful authority and an assertion of potentially arbitrary power.261
In my view, the most reasonable accommodation of competing rule-of-law ideals—even in cases involving plausible allegations of ultra vires action by the judicial branch—calls for a very
strong but not absolutely irrebuttable presumption that final judicial rulings authoritatively settle the obligations of the parties.
Since it is the function of adjudication to resolve questions about
which conscientious officials and citizens reasonably might differ,262 the limit to deference or accession should come only at the
point of unmistakable judicial overreach. Such a standard is neither unworkable nor unprecedented. To cite a comparative law
example, the German Constitutional Court claims jurisdiction to
258 Some have described the resulting dispersal of control over constitutional interpretation as a wedding of departmentalism with “popular constitutionalism.” See Kramer,
The People Themselves at 201 (cited in note 254) (describing a view of departmentalism as
“grounded in” popular constitutionalism). As portrayed by then-Professor Larry Kramer,
popular constitutionalism holds, roughly, that the constitution is written for laypeople,
not lawyers, and that in cases in which the branches of government disagree in their interpretations, ultimate interpretive authority resides in the people themselves, expressing
their views through means that include, but are not limited to, voting in elections. See id
at 91–92.
259 See generally, for example, Larry Alexander and Lawrence B. Solum, Book Review, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 Harv L Rev 1594 (2005).
260 Richard H. Fallon Jr, Judicial Supremacy, Departmentalism, and the Rule of Law
in a Populist Age, 96 Tex L Rev 487, 490–91 (2018).
261 Postema, Law’s Rule at 26 (cited in note 250) (“[T]o judge that one’s act is warranted [by law] is, necessarily, to claim a self-transcending warrant. . . . To deny the office
of others to assess one’s assessments, to judge one’s judgments, is simultaneously to claim
and deny self-transcending warrant.”) (emphasis in original).
262 See, for example, Alexander and Schauer, 110 Harv L Rev at 1377 (cited in note
244) (“When the Constitution is subject to multiple interpretations, a preconstitutional
norm must referee among interpretations to decide what is to be done. One such norm is
that the Supreme Court’s interpretation is authoritative and supreme.”).
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determine whether decisions by the institutions of the European
Union, including the European Court of Justice, are ultra vires—
in which case they would not be binding in Germany—but it has
“always rejected” claims of ultra vires action.263 Although I do not
mean to overstate the determinacy of applicable rules of recognition, historical practice of American officials in acceding to nearly
all judicial rulings exhibits a felt constitutional duty of compliance in all but extreme cases. I have implicitly acknowledged as
much by relying on an improbable hypothetical—involving a judicial order to the House to impeach and the Senate to convict a
sitting president—to illustrate my conceptual point about judicial
accountability for fidelity to law.
Looking to constitutional practice for markers of ultra vires
judicial action that would have no entitlement to obedience, one
might start with the range of considerations that are conventionally accepted as relevant to constitutional interpretation, including, for example, arguments based directly on the words of the
Constitution’s text, arguments regarding various provisions’ historical meanings, arguments based on precedent, and arguments
based on the Constitution’s structure.264 If an assertion of judicial
power were not plausibly supportable based on any of these kinds
of arguments, it would likely be ultra vires, with the likelihood
increasing if the courts lacked the functional capacity to make
sound decisions in the domain over which they had asserted authority. The potential of a particular judicial order to occasion
catastrophically bad consequences might also matter. In a possible example, President Lincoln, in the aftermath of the Merryman
case, noted that he had suspended the writ in response to an existential threat to the United States.265
I emphasize, however, that it is not part of my project here to
resolve the debates that have long surrounded Merryman. My
present interest lies more in establishing a point of constitutional

263 Mehrdad Payandeh, Constitutional Review of EU Law After Honeywell: Contextualizing the Relationship Between the German Constitutional Court and the EU Court of
Justice, 48 Common Mkt L Rev 9, 14–16 (2011).
264 See Richard H. Fallon Jr, A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 Harv L Rev 1189, 1195–1209 (1987). For alternative typologies of modalities of constitutional argument, see Jack M. Balkin, Arguing About the Constitution: The
Topics in Constitutional Interpretation, 33 Const Commen 145, 182–84 (2018); Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution 9–92 (Oxford 1982).
265 Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session at 253 (“To state the
question more directly, are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government
itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?”) (emphasis in original).
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and moral principle than in determining how that principle
should have been applied in the secession crisis. For that purpose,
two observations will suffice. First, Merryman involved the unprecedented and so far unrepeated circumstances of an impending civil war. Second, Chief Justice Taney issued his ruling in
Merryman in his capacity as a circuit justice, not on behalf of the
Supreme Court as an institution. Under an appropriately deferential standard, I believe that the Supreme Court may never have
issued a decision that conscientious officials should have thought
themselves entitled to defy.
C. Political Questions and Ultimate Political Questions
If questions about whether particular judicial rulings are ultra vires and not deserving of obedience are constitutional questions to be resolved by institutions other than the judiciary, they
constitute the ultimate political questions within our system of
government. Ultimate political questions differ from judicially
identified political questions. Their status as such does not require judicial designation, nor does it depend on the judicially
identified criteria outlined in Baker v Carr and subsequent
cases.266 What makes ultimate political questions political is that
nonjudicial actors must resolve them. What makes them ultimate
is that they define the outer boundaries of judicial power to say
which questions are political questions and which are judicial
questions.
Ultimate political questions also have a further connection to
the judicially defined political question doctrine: they directly implicate, and constitute a response to, the ultra vires conundrum.
Ultimate political questions arise, if they arise at all, when nonjudicial officials believe that a purported judicial resolution of
conflicting claims of judicial and extrajudicial jurisdiction is itself
ultra vires. In a showdown between the judicial and nonjudicial
branches of government about which is intra and which is ultra
vires, it would be important to distinguish normative from empirical questions.
As a normative matter, it would be impossible to say categorically whether the courts or a nonjudicial institution ought to prevail. The law should rule, even when authority to speak in the

266 For a similar point, see Seidman, 37 John Marshall L Rev at 480 (cited in note 29)
(“[O]ur own choice between judicial and political constitutionalism poses a secret political
question.”).
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name of the law is contested. And if the law were underdeterminate, then those who had to decide whom to obey should do so
based on considerations of moral legitimacy. Either way, analysis
would need to be case specific.
If we turn from normative issues to empirical projections, the
outcome of a showdown over whether the judiciary had acted ultra vires would almost certainly depend on the balance of respect
and support for the clashing institutions among relevant constituencies. Seeking to offer simultaneous explanations of the existence of judicial review and the recognized limits on its scope, political scientists maintain that judicial power operates within
politically constructed bounds.267 A simplified summary of that
thesis posits that the Supreme Court’s authority to resolve constitutional issues conclusively exists only insofar as its decisions
are ones that Congress, the president, and ultimately the bulk of
the American public will accept as lying within the Court’s jurisdiction to render. When a roughly defined balance of power between courts and political actors has emerged, the prevailing
equilibrium will support rules of recognition under which political
officials know that if they disobey judicial judgments, they will
face condemnation and sanctions, either by Congress, including
through its power over impeachment, or by the American public,
voting in elections. Correspondingly, if courts were perceived as
going too far, and if Congress and the public backed a president
who defied a judicial order, then politics would mark a practical
limit on judicial power.268
Once the dynamics of power come into view, neither logic nor
normative political theory nor my proposed standards of deference to judicial rulings on the limits of judicial power can exclude
the possibility that every judicial ruling might give rise to an ultimate political question. But conditions in which claims of ultra
vires judicial action became routine or even recurrent would be

267 See, for example, Keith E. Whittington, Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy: The Presidency, the Supreme Court, and Constitutional Leadership in US
History 4, 9 (Princeton 2007) (describing “judicial supremacy” as resting on “political foundations”); Mark A. Graber, Constructing Judicial Review, 8 Ann Rev Pol Sci 425, 446–48
(2005) (reviewing the emerging body of political science literature that frames judicial review as an institution constructed by the political branches). See also Corinna Barrett
Lain, Soft Supremacy, 58 Wm & Mary L Rev 1609, 1679 (2017) (“Within the world of
political science, the point is well established—judicial supremacy is a political construct
built over time by the representative branches to further ends that they would find difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish on their own.”).
268 See Fallon, Law and Legitimacy at 108–20 (cited in note 99).
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pathological. If such conditions should ever develop, fault might
lie with political officials, with the courts, or with both. If the conditions for cooperative governance collapsed, the electorate would
likely also bear some responsibility. One way or another, the rule
of law would have broken down.
Nevertheless, short of that unhappy state, not every isolated
overreach of judicial power—whether actual or mistakenly attributed—would evidence a legal system that had run incorrigibly
off the rails. Actual or threatened defiance of judicial rulings
could function as a corrective to judicial overreach. In addition,
recognition that ultimate political questions could arise, and that
they would signify constitutional crises that all should wish to
avoid, may help to keep our constitutional order in a tolerably
functioning condition. The relative continuing success of constitutional government under law depends on the humility and good
sense of a multitude of actors.
In sum, the concept of political questions—in both its doctrinal and its ultimate senses—begins and ends with apprehensions
of, and responses to, ultra vires action by one or another branch
of government, including the judiciary. Where to draw the relevant bounds—defining the jurisdiction of the courts, on the one
hand, and the authority of other institutions, on the other hand—
is in the first instance a judicial question. But once the Supreme
Court has pronounced its judgment, it is always possible that a
political question might arise about whether the Court’s decision
was ultra vires. The rarity with which that question has presented itself historically does not signal that it could not arise,
nor that the possibility of the question’s arising lacks either theoretical or practical importance. Rather, contemplation of the possibility of ultra vires judicial action should teach a lesson about
the foundations of our, and possibly any other, constitutional regime. Responsibility for upholding the minimal requirements of
the rule of law—including by respecting and enforcing the boundaries of constitutionally empowered institutions’ lawful jurisdiction—must be shared among a network of accountability-holding
institutions that centrally includes, but is not limited to, the
judiciary.269

269

See Fallon, 96 Tex L Rev at 520–30 (cited in note 260).
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CONCLUSION
The political question doctrine highlights both the limits of
judicial power and the potential vulnerability of claims of judicial
authority. If any single concept furnishes a key to understanding
the doctrine, it is that of ultra vires action. The political question
doctrine acknowledges that judicial efforts to resolve some questions would be ultra vires. But in recognizing that other branches
have the authority to make conclusive determinations regarding
the proper resolution of political questions, courts, willy-nilly, retain a responsibility to ensure that the other branches do not act
ultra vires, either.
As formulated and applied in cases such as Nixon v United
States and Rucho v Common Cause, the political question doctrine is a judicial construction. Its contours are vague and disputed. In this Article, I have tried to explain why the Supreme
Court so rarely invokes the political question doctrine, despite the
breadth of the doctrine’s supporting rationales. Among other relevant factors, the arguments that would support identifying a
question as political frequently overlap indistinguishably with arguments for upholding a challenged action on the merits.
This Article has also identified previously unrecognized connections between judicially identified political questions and
what I have called ultimate political questions. The latter are
questions about the validity of judicial pronouncements that
claim to mark the permissible limits of judicial authority. Though
courts may attempt to resolve issues about the outer reaches of
their own power, judicial answers that are ultra vires, as gauged
by an appropriately deferential measure, would have no legal title
to obedience. The disobedience of a judicial order could have terrifying, quasi-anarchic consequences. But the theoretical possibility of disobedience should occasion no regret. Political questions
in the ultimate sense—which provide the backdrop against which
courts recognize political questions in the doctrinal sense—occupy the conceptual terrain that separates constitutional government under law from government by judiciary.

